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I. Introduction
In 1995, Texas death row inmate Clarence Lackey argued that the
execution of a prisoner who had spent seventeen years on death row would
violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment.' The rationale behind the Eighth Amendment argument rested on the
severe punishment Lackey had already received during his protracted death
row confinement.2 Lackey contended that years of death row imprison-
ment, coupled with the extreme psychological anguish caused by such
confinement, constitutionally deprived Texas of the power to inflict a death
sentence?
Although the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Lackey v. Texas4
leaves Lackey's question temporarily unanswered, Justice Stevens noted the
novelty and significance of Lackey's claim and wrote a memorandum
* The author would like to thank Professors William S. Geimer and Scott E. Sundby
for their substantive guidance in the development of this Note. The author also extends a
special thanks to Scott A. Johnson for commenting on early drafts of this Note and to
Timothy F. Zitzman for his constant encouragement and valuable editorial assistance.
1. Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421-22 (1995). The Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. See Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421 (considering Lackey's argument that protracted
death row confinement rendered execution unconstitutionally cruel and unusual); see also
Petitioner's Pre-Hearing Brief at 17, Lackey v. Scott, 885 F. Supp. 958 (W.D. Tex. 1995)
(No. MO-95-CA-68-F) (stating that Lackey's protracted death row confinement rendered
execution unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment).
3. See Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421 (considering argument that state had exacted severe
punishment by 17-year death row incarceration and that infliction of death penalty after 17-
year delay would exceed Eighth Amendment limits on state action).
4. Id.
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concurring in the Court's denial of certiorari.' His concurring memoran-
dum (Lackey Memorandum) briefly explored the constitutionality of impos-
ing a death sentence after lengthy death row confinement.' Justice Stevens
observed that the Court has largely relied on two factors in finding capital
punishment constitutionally permissible.' First, the Constitution's framers
(Framers) tolerated capital punishment.8 Second, the death penalty tradi-
tionally has furthered the public goals of retribution and deterrence.9 The
Lackey Memorandum questioned whether either justification retains force
after a prisoner has spent seventeen years on death row.1" Historically, the
Framers did not anticipate protracted imprisonment before execution of a
death sentence. Moreover, a lengthy and severe incarceration followed
by execution of a death sentence may be overly retributive.'2 Finally, any
additional deterrent value of a seventeen-year delay followed by execution,
as compared with a seventeen-year delay followed by life imprisonment,
seems minimal.' 3 In the absence of the factors that justify an execution's
constitutionality, Justice Stevens concluded that imposition of death after
prolonged delay may provide such diminished returns as to be patently
excessive under the Eighth Amendment. 4
5. See id. at 1421-22 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (noting that,
although question was novel and important, Court would postpone review until lower courts
addressed Lackey issue). Justice Stevens observed that the Court's denial of certiorari would
allow lower courts to "serve as laboratories in which the issue receives further study before
it is addressed by this Court." Id. at 1422 (citing McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963
(1983)). Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Stevens that the Lackey question raised an im-
portant and undecided issue. Id. (Breyer, J., agreeing that Lackey issue is important and
undecided).
6. Id. at 1421-22 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
7. Id. (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
8. Id. (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 177 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
9. Id. (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177
(plurality opinion)).
10. Id. at 1422 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
11. See id. at 1421 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (commenting that "a
[17-year] delay, if it ever occurred, certainly would have been rare in 1789").
12. See id. (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (observing that 17-year death
row stay is severe punishment that arguably satisfies state interest in retribution).
13. Id. (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
14. See id. at 1422 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (recognizing that, in
absence of Court's justifying factors, capital punishment is without penological value and
noting that punishment without penological value violates Eighth Amendment); see also
Gomez v. Fierro, 65 U.S.L.W. 3291 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 95-1830) (Stevens &
Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (noting that "[d]elay in the execution of judgments imposing the
death penalty frustrates the public interest in deterrence and eviscerates the only rational
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Since the issuance of Justice Stevens's memorandum, several courts
have considered claims similar to Clarence Lackey's.15 A Lackey-type
claim (Lackey claim) states that execution after protracted death row con-
finement is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amend-
ment of the Constitution. 6 The Eighth Amendment argument hinges on the
torturous psychological conditions prisoners experience during prolonged
death row stays. 7 Due to nearly insurmountable procedural hurdles, how-
ever, courts have yet to decide the Eighth Amendment claim on its merits."8
This Note argues that execution after protracted death row confinement
violates the Eighth Amendment. 19 Part II explores the documented mental
justification for that type of punishment").
15. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1996) (raising Lackey-
type Eighth Amendment delay claim); Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir.
1996) (same); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); Turner v.
Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 926 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th
Cir. 1995) (same); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); Free v.
Peters, 50 F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483,
1485 (lth Cir. 1995) (same).
16. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1996) (considering pris-
oner's argument that execution after 17-year death row delay violates Eighth Amendment);
Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 1996) (considering prisoner's argument
that execution after 14-year death row delay violates Eighth Amendment); Stafford v. Ward,
59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995) (considering prisoner's argument that execution after
15-year death row delay violates Eighth Amendment); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 926
(4th Cir. 1995) (same); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995) (considering
petitioner's argument that execution after 20-year death row delay violates Eighth Amend-
ment); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1995) (considering petitioner's argu-
ment that execution after 10-year death row delay violates Eighth Amendment); Free v.
Peters, 50 F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995) (considering petitioner's argument that execution
after 20-year death row delay violates Eighth Amendment); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d
1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995) (considering petitioner's argument that execution after 17-year
death row delay violates Eighth Amendment).
17. See Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421 (1995) (Stevens, I., respecting denial
of certiorari) (commenting on severe mental suffering caused by death sentence and noting
debilitating psychological effects of prisoner's uncertainty as to date of execution).
18. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Eighth
Amendment delay claim as Teague-barred); Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th
Cir. 1996) (rejecting Lackey claim as barred by abuse of habeas writ doctrine); Stafford v.
Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 926 (4th
Cir. 1995) (same); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Fearance
v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); Lackey v. Scott, 52 F.3d 98, 100 (5th
Cir. 1995) (rejecting Eighth Amendment delay claim as Teague-barred); Free v. Peters, 50
F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting Lackey claim as barred by abuse of habeas writ
doctrine); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995) (same).
19. Readers should note that, on April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (ATEDA). Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. ATEDA sub-
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suffering caused by lengthy death row incarceration.0 Part I examines
the substantive Eighth Amendment issues underlying Lackey claims, includ-
ing the death row delay21 and the prolonged mental suffering ' that trigger
Eighth Amendment protections. Part IV addresses the procedural hurdles
associated with Lackey claims and proposes solutions for these dilemmas .1
Part V discusses the policy implications of Lackey claims, including the
length and types of death row delay that give rise to an Eighth Amendment
claim, as well as an appropriate remedy for such claims.'
I. Mental Suffering Caused by Protracted Death Row Confinement
The Lackey claim rests on the well-documented fact that condemned
prisoners experience severe mental suffering while awaiting execution:
For over two years, [death row prisoner] Henry Arsenault "lived on
death row feeling as if the [c]ourt's sentence were slowly being carried
out." Arsenault could not stop thinking about death. Despite several
"stays, he never believed he could escape execution. "There was a day
to day choking, tremulous fear that quickly became suffocating." If he
slept at all, fear of death snapped him awake sweating. His throat was
clenched so tight he often could not eat. His belly cramped, and he
could not move his bowels. He urinated uncontrollably. He could not
keep still. And all the while a guard watched him, so he would not com-
mit suicide. The guard was there when he had his nightmares and there
when he wet his pants. Arsenault retained neither privacy nor dignity.
Apart from the guards he was alone much of the time as the day of his
stantially shortens filing deadlines for federal habeas corpus petitions, see 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2244(d)(1)(A), 2263(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1996), and limits issues that prisoners can raise
in the habeas stages of capital proceedings, see id. § 2264(a)(1)-(3). As part of ongoing
congressional habeas reform efforts, ATEDA effectively accelerates the pace of executions
and will most likely result in fewer cases of protracted death row confinement. See Jeanne-
Marie S. Raymond, Note, The Incredible Shrinking Writ: Habeas Corpus Under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, CAP. DEF. J., Dec. 1996, at 52, 52-
56 (discussing ATEDA and its effects).
20. See infra notes* 25-38 and accompanying text (examining severe psychological
effects of lengthy death row confinement).
21. See infra notes 39-77 and accompanying text (discussing how Eighth Amendment
prohibits protracted pre-execution delay).
22. See infra notes 78-132 and accompanying text (arguing that Eighth Amendment
should prohibit mental suffering caused by death row confinement).
23. See infra notes 133-87 and accompanying text (discussing procedural bars associ-
ated with Lackey claims).
24. See infra notes 188-250 and accompanying text (discussing policy implications of
Lackey claim and showing that commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment is
appropriate remedy for Lackey claim).
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execution neared. Arsenault asked the warden to let him walk to the exe-
cution on his own. The time came. He walked to the death chamber and
turned toward the chair. Stopping him, the warden explained that the
execution would not be for over an hour. Arsenault sat on the other side
of the room as the witnesses filed in behind a one-way mirror. When the
executioner tested the chair, the lights dimmed. Arsenault heard other
prisoners scream. After the chaplain gave him last rites, Arsenault heard
the door slam shut and the noise echoing, the clock ticking. He wet his
pants. Less than half an hour before the execution, the Lieutenant Gov-
ernor commuted his sentence. Arsenault's legs would not hold him up.
Guards carried him back to his cell. He was trembling uncontrollably.
A doctor sedated him. And he was moved off death row.25
Accounts of death row describe an atmosphere of total despair and hope-
lessness.' The enforced isolation and extreme security measures of death
25. District Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1290 (Mass. 1980) (Liacos, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Arsenault's description of his death row experience);
see also Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari) (recognizing that mental pain condemned prisoners suffer is "a significant form
of punishment" that "may well be comparable to the consequences of the ultimate step
itself"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 288 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (comment-
ing that "mental pain is an inseparable part of our practice of punishing criminals by death,
for the prospect of pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the inevitable long wait
between the imposition of sentence and the actual infliction of death"); People v. Anderson,
493 P.2d 880, 894-96 (Cal.) (finding that death penalty violated California Constitution
because it inflicted "psychological torture" on prisoners), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972),
superseded by constitutional amendment as stated in People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 984 (Cal.
1992). In Anderson, the Supreme Court of California determined:
The cruelty of capital punishment lies not only in the execution itself and the pain
incident thereto, but also in the dehumanizing effects of the lengthy imprisonment
prior to execution during which the judicial and administrative procedures essen-
tial to due process of law are carried out. Penologists and medical experts agree
that the (protracted] process of carrying out a verdict of death is often so degrad-
ing and brutalizing to the human spirit as to constitute psychological torture.
Anderson, 493 P.2d at 894 (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 339
N.E.2d 676, 680 (Mass. 1975) (Tauro, J., concurring) (noting that "[t]he convicted felon
suffers extreme anguish in anticipation of the extinction of his existence"); Hopkinson v.
State, 632 P.2d 79, 209-11 (Wyo. 1981) (Rose, J., dissenting in part) (recognizing "the
dehumanizing effects of long imprisonment pending execution"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922
(1982).
26. See Catholic Comm'n for Justice & Peace v. Attorney Gen., No. S.C. 73/93 (Sup.
Ct. Zimb. June 24, 1993), reprinted in 14 HuM. RTs. L.J. 323, 335 (1993) (noting that
"from the moment he enters the condemned cell, the prisoner is enmeshed in a dehumaniz-
ing environment of near hopelessness .... the sole object is to preserve his life so that he
may be executed .... [he] is the 'living dead'"), overruled by ZIMB. CONST. amend. XIII
(amending Declaration of Rights' Section 15).
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row result in a dehumanizing, laboratory-like environment.'
Moreover, lengthy delays intensify the mental suffering caused by
pre-execution confinement.' Studies show that prolonged death row
incarceration undermines a prisoner's sanity and contributes to the total
devastation of the inmate's personality.2 9 An "unending, uninterrupted
immersion in death""0 can continue for years while the appellate process
27. See Louis J. West, Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty, in VoicEs
AGAINST DEATH 290-91 (Philip E. Mackey ed., 1976) (noting that death row is "organized
and controlled in grim caricature of a laboratory, [in which] the condemned prisoner's
personality is subjected to incredible stress for prolonged periods of time"); William A.
Schabas, Execution Delayed, Execution Denied, 5 CIlM. L.F. 180, 183-84 (1994) (describ-
ing death row). Schabas noted:
Combine a hospital ward for the terminally ill, an institution for the crimi-
nally insane, and an ultramaximum security wing in a penitentiary, and one
begins to approach the horror of death row. The inherent dangerousness of the
inmates, their utter despair, the futility of any efforts at rehabilitation or training
all contribute to a carceral environment that combines extreme security measures,
confinement to cells for most of the day, and virtual inactivity.
Id. (citation omitted).
28. See Note, Mental Suffering Under Sentence of Death, 57 IowA L. REV. 814, 830
(1972) (commenting that "human reaction to the threat of death is a function of the duration,
as well as the nature of the threat").
29. See id. at 829 (discussing mentally debilitative effects of lengthy death row
confinement resulting in "undermining of sanity" and "destruction of spirit"). Death row
prisoners use defense mechanisms to combat intense mental suffering. Id. Without use of
these coping mechanisms, the prisoner experiences disorganization and total capitulation to
anxiety. Id. (citation omitted). The defense mechanisms, however, produce aberrant
patterns of behavior including denial of possible execution, denial by living only in the
present, obsessive preoccupation with religious or intellectual matters, projection, and
delusion. Id. at 828 & n.78 (citation omitted).
30. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 58, Turner v. Jabe (Va. May 22, 1995) (No.
95-0777). Convicted capital offender Willie Lloyd Turner, executed in 1995, described his
death row experience:
It's the unending, uninterrupted immersion in death that wears on you so much.
It's the parade of friends and acquaintances who leave for the death house and
never come back, while your own desperate and lonely time drains away. It's
the boring routine of claustrophobic confinement, punctuated by eye-opening
dates with death that you helplessly hope will be averted. It's watching yourself
die over the years in the eyes of family and friends, who, with every lost appeal,
add to the emotional scar tissue that protects them, long before you're gone,
from your death. It's understanding that I was responsible for the death of Mr.
Smith and wishing that there was some way that I could undo that one awful
moment. It's feeling the pain and sorrow of Mr. Smith's family and wishing that
they could understand, even though I know that they could never forgive
me.... My lawyer tells me that I've spent over 5000 days on death row. Not
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plays out." As a prisoner approaches exhaustion of appellate issues, the
repeated rescheduling and withdrawal of execution dates exacerbate mental
suffering.32
Commentators have noted that death row prisoners suffer extreme
psychological anguish in anticipation of death.33 The onset of insanity while
awaiting execution is not uncommon. 4 The stressful environment and iso-
lation from nearly all human contact create mental agony properly charac-
terized as psychological torture:
a single waking hour of any of those days has gone by without me thinking about
my date with the executioner.
Id.
31. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that peti-
tioner spent 17 years on death row); Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 1996)
(noting that petitioner spent 14 years on death row); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028
(10th Cir. 1995) (noting that petitioner spent 15 years on death row); Turner v. Jabe, 58
F.3d 924, 925 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir.
1995) (noting that petitioner spent 20 years on death row); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633,
635 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that petitioner spent 10 years on death row); Free v. Peters, 50
F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that petitioner spent 20 years on death row); Porter
v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that petitioner spent 17 years on
death row).
32. See West, supra note 27, at 291 (finding that death row delay, especially if
punctuated by last-minute reprieves, exacerbates mental suffering).
33. See cases cited supra note 25 (discussing inevitable mental anguish of death row
inmates); see also Vicki Quade, The Voice of Dead Men: Interview with Sister Helen
Prejean, A.B.A. SEC. OF IN IDUAL RTs. & REsPS., Summer 1996, at 12, 12-16 (conduct-
ing interview with death penalty abolitionist Sister Helen Prejean). Sister Prejean com-
mented:
Torture is intrinsic to the death penalty. And we can argue about how
much torture there is to the electric chair, or gas chamber, or even lethal injec-
tions, about what people feel physically.
But I can witness, in fact, that people have died a thousand times mentally
before they've died physically. You can't condemn a person to death and not
have them anticipate their death, imagine their death, and vicariously experience
their death many, many times before they die.
Every one of the men I've accompanied have all had the same night-
mare. . . . The same nightmare is they're coming to get me, the guards are
holding me down, the execution chamber, I'm fighting, I'm sweating, and I'm
yelling, "No, no."
If we can acknowledge that brainwashing is a form of torture, then how
long will it take us to acknowledge that sentencing conscious human beings to
their death is a form of torture.
Id. at 14.
34. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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The raw terror and unabating stress that [the condemned prisoner] experi-
enced was torture; torture in the guise of civilized business in an ad-
vanced and humane polity. This torture was not unique, but merely one
degrading instance in a legacy of degradation. The ordeals of the con-
demned are inherent and inevitable in any system that informs the con-
demned person of his sentence and provides for a gap between sentence
and execution. Whatever one believes about the cruelty of the death
penalty itself, this violence done the prisoner's mind must afflict the con-
science of enlightened government and give the civilized heart no rest? 5
Penologists, 36 psychiatrists, 37 and jurists38 agree that a condemned prisoner's
mental ordeal approaches the limit of human endurance.
II. Substantive Issues
A. How Prolonged Pre-Execution Delay Implicates
the Eighth Amendment
Substantive analysis reveals that the Eighth Amendment embodies a
value which prohibits execution after protracted death row incarceration.39
35. District Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1291 (Mass. 1980) (Liacos, J.,
concurring) (equating mental stress of death row inmate with psychological torture); see also
People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972), super-
seded by constitutional amendment as stated in People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 984 (Cal.
1992).
36. E.g., CLINTON T. DUFFY, EIGHTY-EIGHT MEN AND Two WOMEN 254 (1962)
(commenting on lengthy death row incarceration). Duffy, a former warden of California's
San Quentin prison, stated: "One night on death row is too long, and the length of time
spent there by [some inmates] constitutes cruelty that defies the imagination. It has always
been a source of wonder to me that they didn't all go stark, raving mad." Id.
37. See West, supra note 27, at 292 (noting that condemned inmates experience
"behavioral aberrations ranging from malingering to acute psychotic breaks"); Harvey Blue-
stone & Carl L. McGahee, Reaction to Extreme Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 119
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 393, 393 (1962) (commenting that death sentence inflicts "the greatest
of stresses"). See generally Johnnie L. Gallemore, Jr. & James H. Panton, Inmate Re-
sponses to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167, 171 (1967)
(discussing death row inmates' psychiatric interviews and psychological testing to ascertain
effects of extended death row confinement).
38. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 288 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(comparing condemned prisoners' mental suffering to suffering Court found impermissibly
cruel in Trop v. Dules, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)); Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1283 (finding Massa-
chusetts capital punishment statute impermissibly cruel and concluding that "death penalty
is unacceptable under contemporary standards of decency in its unique and inherent capacity
to inflict pain ... the mental agony is, simply and beyond question, a horror").
39. See infra notes 40-132 and accompanying text (examining how Eighth Amendment
prohibits inordinate death row delay and severe mental suffering).
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In the Lackey Memorandum, Justice Stevens duly noted that imposition of
the death penalty does not violate the Constitution and stated that the
Court has relied on two factors in finding infliction of the death penalty to
be constitutionally acceptable.4" First, the Framers considered capital pun-
ishment permissible.42 Second, the death penalty serves both retributive and
deterrent functions.' Justice Stevens observed that neither factor may
retain force after years of death row imprisonment.' Absent the Court's
justifying factors, capital punishment may provride such diminished social
and public returns as to be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.4'
The first factor - whether the Framers found a punishment unaccept-
able when the United States adopted the Bill of Rights - requires an exami-
nation of past practices. If the Framers considered a punishment cruel and
unusual, the Court afortiori finds the same punishment cruel and unusual
today.' Although little evidence exists as to the Framers' intent regarding
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,47 history demonstrates that
40. See Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421 (1995) (Stevens, I., respecting denial
of certiorari) (stating that Court has found that capital punishment is not per se unconstitu-
tional).
41. See id. (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (noting that Court has applied
two factors in determining constitutionality of death penalty (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 177, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion))).
42. See id. (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (stating that Court has found
capital punishment constitutional, in part, because Framers considered capital punishment
permissible when United States adopted Bill of Rights (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177
(plurality opinion))).
43. See id. (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (noting that Court has found
capital punishment constitutional, in part, because it serves "two principal social purposes:
retribution and deterrence" (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion))).
44. Id. (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
45. Id. at 1422 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari); see Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (determining that capital punishment is
constitutional only "when it [is] justified by the social ends it [is] deemed to serve"); see
also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion) (finding that punishment imposed must have
penological justification without which punishment is gratuitous infliction of suffering).
46. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989) (rejecting claim that
execution of juveniles violated Eighth Amendment because Framers did not consider capital
punishment of juveniles cruel and unusual when United States adopted Bill of Rights); Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989) (noting that, at minimum, Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits punishments considered cruel and unusual when Framers adopted Bill of Rights); Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (determining that proposed execution of insane
prisoner violated Eighth Amendment because Framers found execution of insane prisoners
constitutionally impermissible when United States adopted Bill of Rights).
47. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 258-62 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that there is
"very little evidence of the Framers' intent in including the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
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early American courts and legislatures did not permit prolonged death row
delay.' Rather, these courts and legislatures advocated swift infliction of
the death penalty to further penological goals and to prevent the condemned
prisoner from suffering unnecessarily.49
The Court has also looked to the English common law to illuminate the
Framers' constitutional vision.'0 A recent decision by the Judicial Commit-
tee of the Privy Council"' indicates that English common law did not
Clause among those restraints upon the Government enumerated in the Bill of Rights").
48. See Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1422 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial
of certiorari) (noting that protracted death row delay was rare in 1789 and concluding that
Framers' practice could not justify denying Lackey claim); PHILIP ENGLISH MACKEY, HANG-
ING IN THE BALANCE: THE ANTI-CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK STATE,
1776-1861, at 17, 20 (Frank Freidel ed., 1982) (demonstrating that New York's colonial
laws required execution of convicted felons after fourth day following sentencing at trial);
1 ROBERT GREEN MCCLESKEY, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 45 (1967) (commenting that
delay in execution undermines social value of punishment). In the early 1790s, James
Wilson, a Framer of the Constitution and an early U.S. Supreme Court Justice, stated:
The principles both of utility and of justice require, that the commission of a
crime should be followed by speedy infliction of the punishment .... After
conviction, the punishment assigned to an inferior offen[s]e should be inflicted
with much expedition. This will strengthen the useful association between them;
one appearing as the immediate and unavoidable consequence of the other.
When a sentence of death is pronounced, such an interval should be permitted to
elapse before its execution, as will render the language of political expediency
consonant to the language of religion. Under these qualifications, the speedy
punishment should form a part of every system of criminal jurisprudence.
Id.; see also EDGAR J. McMANUS, LAW AND LIBERTY IN EARLY NEw ENGLAND 182 (1993)
(stating that condemned prisoners in early New England "were put to death without moral
qualms, but they were dispatched swiftly without unnecessary suffering"); BARRETT PRETTY-
MAN, JR., DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 307 (1961) ("Before the beginning of the
twentieth century, substantial delay between trial and execution was almost unthinkable, in
part because of the wear and tear on the defendant. As one lawyer put it in 1774: 'The
cruelty of an execution after respite is equal to many deaths, and therefore there is rarely
an instance of it.'"(quoting unnamed source)).
49. See 1 MCCLESKEY, supra note 48, at 45 (noting that early American jurists
believed speedy infliction of death penalty was necessary to serve ends of justice); PRETTY-
MAN, supra note 48, at 307 (stating that early Americans were aware that death row delay
caused severe mental suffering in condemned prisoners).
50. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925) (finding that Constitution
"cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British institu-
tions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted"); Kempner v. United
States, 195 U.S. 100, 125 (1904) (concluding that "[ifn ascertaining the meaning of a phrase
from the Bill of Rights it must be construed with reference to the [English] common law
from which it was taken"); Ex parte Weeks, 59 U.S. 307, 311 (1856) (stating that Court
must interpret Constitution according to English laws with which Framers were familiar).
51. See infra note 128 and accompanying text (describing authority of Privy Council).
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condone protracted pre-execution confinement.52  In 1689, the English
Declaration of Rights - which prohibited "cruell and unusuall Punish-
ments" - took shape from the English common law. 3 Commonwealth
jurists have suggested that the English Declaration of Rights, like the
English common law, prohibited imposition of the death penalty after pro-
longed incarceration 4
The Framers directly incorporated the English Declaration of Rights'
cruel and unusual punishments clause into the Eighth Amendment.55 The
52. See Pratt v. Attorney Gen., [1994] 2 App. Cas. 1 (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from
Jam.) (en bane) (finding that execution of two Jamaican citizens after 14-year death row
incarceration constituted impermissibly cruel punishment), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 364, 366-
68 (1994). In Pratt, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom
(Privy Council) asserted that the United Kingdom has always carried out capital punishment
expeditiously after sentencing, within a matter of weeks or, in the event of an appeal to the
House of Lords, within a matter of months: "Delays in terms of years are unheard of."
Pratt, 33 I.L.M. at 365. The Privy Council noted "the pre-existing common law practice
that execution followed as swiffly as practical after sentence," id. at 369, and commented
that "before independence [from England] the law would have protected a ... citizen from
being executed after unconscionable delay." Id. at 379. The Privy Council concluded:
It is difficult to envisage any circumstance in which in England a condemned man
would have been kept in prison for years awaiting execution. But if such a
situation had been brought to the attention of the court their lordships do not
doubt that the judges would have stayed the execution to enable the prerogative
of mercy to be exercised and the sentence commuted to one of life imprisonment.
1d. at 367.
53. An Act for Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the
Succession of the Crown, 1689, 1 W. & M., ch. 2, § 10 (Eng.).
54. See Riley v. Attorney Gen., [1983] 1 App. Cas. 719, 734-35 (P.C. 1983) (appeal
taken from Jam.) (Lords Scarman & Brightman, dissenting) (concluding that "the jurispru-
dence of the civilized world ... recogniz[ing] and acknowledg[ing] that prolonged delay
in executing a sentence of death can make the punishment when it comes inhuman and
degrading... is derived from common law principles and the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments in the English [Declaration] of Rights"). The Riley dissenters addition-
ally noted that "[t]here is a formidable case for suggesting that execution after inordinate
delay would have infringed the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to be found
in Section 10 of the Bill of Rights of 1689." Id. at 734. In 1993, a unanimous decision by
an en bane Privy Council vindicated the Riley dissenters' position. See Pratt, 33 I.L.M. at
380 (re-examining Riley and concluding that death row delays of more than five years have
strong presumption of unconstitutionality); see also infra note 128 and accompanying text
(describing Privy Council).
55. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(determining that Section 10 of 1689 English Declaration of Rights is antecedent of Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 840
(1969) (noting that Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is "a
verbatim copy of a prohibition in the English Bill of Rights of 1689").
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historical connection between the Eighth Amendment, the 1689 English
Declaration of Rights, and the English common law suggests that these
bodies of law share similar values.5 6 Because the antecedents of the Eighth
Amendment prohibited execution after protracted delays,' the Eighth
Amendment should retain that same value.
Historical evidence does not demonstrate that the Framers tolerated
execution after prolonged incarceration." Therefore, infliction of the death
penalty after lengthy delay may violate the Eighth Amendment unless the
Court's second justifying factor - furtherance of the goals of retribution
and deterrence - is met. 9 Although Justice Stevens did not address the
56. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (showing that English common law
gave rise to 1689 English Declaration of Rights, which informed Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 319 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that Framers intended Eighth Amendment to retain values
of 1689 English Declaration of Rights); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925)
(asserting that courts cannot safely interpret Constitution without reference to English
common law and English institutions); Kempner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 125 (1904)
(concluding that accurate interpretation of Bill of Rights requires deference to English
common law); cf VA. CODE ANN. § 1-10 (Michie 1995) (codifying English common law).
The English common law is of such precedential importance in Virginia that the General
Assembly has codified it: "The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to
the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue
in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General
Assembly." Id.
57. See supra notes 52, 54 and accompanying text (showing that antecedents of Eighth
Amendment, including 1689 English Declaration of Rights and English common law, did
not sanction protracted confinement before execution of death sentence).
58. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text (discussing historical evidence that
suggests Framers did not tolerate protracted pre-execution delay).
59. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (deter-
mining that constitutionality of capital punishment largely relies on (1) Framers' tolerance
of capital punishment and (2) public goals of retribution and deterrence); see also Furman,
408 U.S. at 312-13 (White, J., concurring) (noting that capital punishment's constitutionality
hinges on capital punishment's furtherance of public goals). In Furman, Justice White
stated:
The imposition and execution of the death penalty are obviously cruel in the
dictionary sense. But the penalty has not been considered cruel and unusual
punishment in the constitutional sense because it was thought justified by the
social ends it was deemed to serve. At the moment that it ceases realistically to
further these purposes, however, the emerging question is whether its imposition
in such circumstances would violate the Eighth Amendment. It is my view that
it would, for its imposition would then be the pointless and needless extinction
of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public
purpose. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be patently
excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. (White, J., concurring).
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merits of the Lackey claim,6' he postulated that neither penological goal
retains force when prisoners have spent protracted periods of time on death
row.
6 1
Lackey claimants contend that prolonged death row imprisonment is
punishment that satisfies the state's interest in retribution.62 Indeed, pro-
tracted death row delays coupled with execution may result in punishment
that exceeds the state's interest in retribution.6' Although the Court has
found the incidental physical pain of execution to be constitutionally permis-
sible,' Eighth Amendment analysis turns on whether pain is a necessary
part of the punishment. ' Arguably, neither protracted delay nor psycholog-
ical suffering is inherently necessary to a death sentence. ' Because long-
60. See Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1422 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial
of certiorari) (stating that Court would not rule on merits of Lackey question and determin-
ing that Lackey question would benefit from lower court review).
61. See id. at 1421 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (noting that execution
after protracted delay may not further public goals of retribution and deterrence); see also
Gomez v. Fierro, 117 S. Ct. 285, 285 (1996) (Stevens & Breyer, Ji., dissenting) (noting
that "[delay in the execution of judgments imposing the death penalty frustrates the public
interest in deterrence").
62. See Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1422 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (stating
that prisoner's 17-year death row incarceration arguably satisfied state interest in retribu-
tion); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1486 (9th Cir. 1995) (Norris, J., dissenting) (noting
that petitioner's 20-year death row incarceration arguably satisfied state interest in retribu-
tion); Petitioner's Pre-Hearing Brief at 38, Lackey v. Scott, 885 F. Supp. 958 (W.D. Tex.
1995) (No. MO-95-CA-68-F) (contending that state had exacted enough punishment from
Clarence Lackey because of his 17-year death row incarceration and asserting that to permit
state "to extinguish Lackey's life would, constitutionally speaking, cause the cup to runneth
over"); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 16-28, 44, Turner v. Jabe (Va. May 22,
1995) (No. 95-0777) (describing conditions of Virginia death row and arguing that state
lacked legitimate interest to inflict death penalty after petitioner's protracted exposure to
death row conditions); see also Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens,
J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (recognizing that mental pain suffered by condemned
prisoner awaiting execution is significant punishment comparable to punishment of actual
execution).
63. Cf Louisiana cc rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (determining
that Constitution only permits suffering necessary to extinguish life humanely); In re
Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890) (finding that pre-execution solitary confinement and
uncertainty of execution date increased punishment of execution).
64. See Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464 (asserting that Constitution only permits suffering
necessary to form of punishment).
65. Id.; see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (finding that Eighth
Amendment protects condemned prisoners from unnecessary fear and pain); see also In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (noting that state violates Eighth Amendment when
punishment is "more than mere extinguishment of life").
66. C. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464 (concluding that Constitution only permits suffering
necessary to extinguish life humanely).
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time death row inmates undergo punishment distinct from execution, 67 and
because neither severe mental suffering nor prolonged incarceration is a
necessary aspect of execution,68 Lackey claimants may experience gratuitous
pain that is violative of the Eighth Amendment.69
Moreover, the Court has found that the deterrent value of any punish-
ment depends on the speed with which the state administers a sentence. 70
Without the swift imposition of penalties, the deterrent value of punishment
erodes. 71 Because the deterrent value of even a speedily imposed death
67. See Balkcom, 451 U.S. at 952 (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)
(stating that condemned prisoner awaiting execution suffers mental pain that is "a significant
punishment" comparable to actual execution); Medley, 134 U.S. at 172 (noting that con-
demned prisoner's mental suffering amounts to an increase in punishment of execution); cf.
People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal.) (finding capital punishment cruel because of
dehumanizing effect of death row imprisonment), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972),
superseded by constitutional amendment as stated in People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 984 (Cal.
1992); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (finding
that onset of insanity while awaiting execution is not uncommon).
68. Cf. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410 (determining that Eighth Amendment protects con-
demned prisoners from unnecessary fear and pain); Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463 (finding that
Eighth Amendment prohibits unnecessary pain in execution of death sentence); Kemmler,
136 U.S. at 447 (asserting that death penalty violates Eighth Amendment when execution
is "something more than mere extinguishment of life").
69. Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421-22 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial
of certiorari); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (conclud-
ing that Eighth Amendment prohibits gratuitous infliction of suffering); Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (noting Eighth Amendment prohibition of
.unnecessary pain" and determining that Constitution only permits suffering necessary to
extinguish life humanely).
70. See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, I., concurring in
denial of certiorari) (determining that punishment's deterrent value hinges on promptness
with which state inflicts punishment); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962)
(commenting that delay undermines deterrent function of punishment). In Coppedge, the
Court stated:
When society acts to deprive one of its members of his life, liberty or property,
it takes its most awesome steps. No general respect for, nor adherence to, the
law as a whole can well be expected without judicial recognition of the para-
mount need for prompt, eminently fair, and sober criminal law procedures ....
[In particular], the preference to be accorded to criminal appeals recognizes the
need for speedy disposition of such cases. Delay in the final judgement of
conviction, including its appellate review, unquestionably erodes the efficacy of
law enforcement.
Id.
71. See Coppedge, 369 U.S. at 449 (stating that delay undermines public's adherence
to law); Justice Lewis Powell, Commentary: Capital Punishment, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1035,
1035 (1989) (noting that "years of delay between sentencing and execution.. . undermines
the deterrent effect of capital punishment and reduces public confidence in our criminal
justice system").
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penalty is debatable,' execution after years of delay logically offers even
less in furtherance of that goal.'
Courts cannot rely on the Framers' intent to justify execution after
protracted death row confinement.7 Furthermore, the punishment Lackey
claimants experience may be excessively retributive75 and offers little, if
any, deterrent effect.76 In the absence of the Court's justifying factors,
imposition of a death sentence after lengthy delay should be considered cruel
and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.'
B. How Mental Suffering Implicates the Eighth Amendment
Although delay significantly undermines capital punishment's historical
and penological justifications," focusing solely on the length of confinement
72. See Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1038 & n.9 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that research studies fail to show that death penalty has deterrent effect and
stating that research studies show capital punishment actually increases levels of violence
(citing William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What Is the
Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 453-84 (1980) (noting that controlled, 56-year
study in New York state revealed that average of two additional homicides occurred in
month following execution); Robert M. Morgenthau, What Prosecutors Won't Tell You,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1995, at A25 (finding that experienced prosecutors believe that "by
their brutalizing and dehumanizing effect, executions cause more murders than they
prevent')); see also Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 357 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (doubting that death penalty performs meaningful deterrent function); Judge Alex
Kozinski, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CAsE WEST. RES. L. REv. 1, 25 (1995)
("'The death penalty, as we now administer it, has no deterrent value because it is imposed
so infrequently and so freakishly."); cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[G]ovemment is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious.").
73. See Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421-22 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari)
(stating that deterrent value of execution after protracted confinement seems minimal); see
also 141 CONG. REC. S7804 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter) (comment-
ing that "in the current context in which habeas corpus appeals now run for as long as a
couple of decades, the deterrent effect of capital punishment has been virtually eliminated").
74. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text (discussing historical evidence which
shows that Framers did not tolerate protracted pre-execution delay).
75. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (noting that protracted death row
confinement arguably satisfies state interest in retribution and asserting that death penalty
after prolonged delay may exceed state interest in retribution).
76. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing minimal deterrent effect
gained by execution after protracted death row confinement).
77. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (noting that constitutionality of death
sentence largely hinges on (1) evidence of Framers' intent and (2) furtherance of social or
public purpose).
78. See supra notes 39-77 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality of death
row delays and showing how delay undermines capital punishment's historical and penologi-
cal justifications).
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disregards the full extent of Lackey's Eighth Amendment argument. 9 A
Lackey claim argues that, in addition to delay, the severe mental suffering
death row inmates experience renders execution constitutionally impermissi-
ble.' Although the Court has yet to find that death row's psychological
impact exceeds Eighth Amendment limits, judicial treatment of mental
suffering demonstrates that psychological pain is, indeed, constitutionally
cognizable. 8
As early as 1890, the Court recognized that pre-execution mental
anxiety increases a prisoner's punishment.' In In re Medley,' the Court
considered the constitutionality of a Colorado law that mandated pre-execu-
tion solitary confinement and allowed prison wardens to conceal execution
dates from condemned prisoners.' Although the Court ultimately found the
Colorado law unconstitutional on ex post facto grounds,' the Court ex-
pressed concern for the condemned prisoner's mental state during pre-exe-
cution confinement.' The Court noted that society had long recognized
solitary confinement as an additional punishment of the "most important and
painful character."'  The Court also observed that solitary confinement
caused undesirable psychological effects8" and that the punishment's severity
79. Cf. Note, supra note 28, at 830 (stating that psychological reaction to death
sentence is function of both duration of threat and nature of threat).
80. See Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1422 n.1 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting
denial of certiorari) (noting prisoner's argument that severe mental suffering experienced
during prisoner's protracted death row confinement rendered execution constitutionally
impermissible); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 45, Turner v. Jabe (Va. May 22,
1995) (No. 95-0777) (challenging constitutionality of inflicting death penalty after prisoner
endured severe mental suffering during 15-year death row incarceration).
81. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 16 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(recognizing psychological pain as constitutionally cognizable); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 271 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (commenting that Framers recognized
cruelty other than cruelty of punishments causing physical pain); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 102 (1958) (finding punishment of expatriation unconstitutional because of punishment's
unconstitutionally cruel psychological effects); Smith v. Aldingers, 999 F.2d 109, 110 n.4
(5th Cir. 1993) (noting that mental or psychological torture can violate Eighth Amendment).
82. See In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890) (determining that condemned
prisoner's solitary confinement and uncertainty as to execution date caused mental suffering
that increased level of punishment).
83. 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
84. Id. at 161-62.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 168, 171-72 (describing debilitating psychological effects of solitary
confinement and uncertainty as to execution date).
87. Id. at 171.
88. Id. at 168. The Court noted the adverse psychological effects of solitary confine-
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had sparked public outrage resulting in the repeal of British laws imposing
pre-execution solitary confinement.8 9 Finally, the Court noted that the pris-
oner's uncertainty as to his execution date had needlessly cruel psychologi-
cal effects.'
Medley marked the Court's early acknowledgment of the gratuitous
mental suffering that accompanies a death sentence.91 Although decided on
grounds unrelated to the constitutionality of mental suffering, the 1890
opinion shows the Court's awareness that the psychological effects of pre-
execution confinement significantly increase the punishment of a death
sentence.' Given that the Medley Court disapproved of the psychological
consequences of four weeks of uncertainty, 93 the cruelty of uncertainty pre-
sumably applies with even greater force when delay lasts for many years. 4
Despite Medley, Eighth Amendment mental suffering claims met with
little success' until the Court's 1958 decision in Trop v. Dulles.' In Trop,
the Court determined that denationalization of a wartime deserter violated
ment and described a solitary confinement study showing that:
A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into
a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them,
and others became violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those
who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did
not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the
community.
Id.
89. See id. at 170 (noting that Parliament repealed British laws mandating pre-execu-
tion solitary confinement because "public sentiment revolted against [the punishment's]
severity").
90. Id. at 172. The Court commented: "[W]hen a prisoner sentenced to death is
confined in the penitentiary awaiting the execution of the sentence, one of the most horrible
feelings to which he can be subjected during that time is the uncertainty [creating an]
immense mental anxiety amounting to a great increase in the offender's punishment." Id.
91. See id. (concluding that uncertainty as to execution date increased punishment of
execution).
92. Id. at 168-72 (finding that condemned prisoner's mental suffering increased
severity of death sentence).
93. Id. at 161-62.
94. See Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial
of certiorari) (stating that Medley Court's findings regarding cruel effects of uncertainty
apply with more force when delay lasts for many years).
95. See Louisiana er rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 473-74 (1947) (rejecting
Eighth Amendment mental suffering claim by condemned prisoner who survived state's first
attempt at electrocution); McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 160 (1891) (declining to find
that statute mandating pre-execution solitary confinement violated Eighth Amendment).
96. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishient. In
finding denationalization unconstitutionally cruel, the Court emphasized the
terrifying psychological effects of statelessness, including fear engendered
by an individual's total loss of political rights.98 The Court found that
denationalization's potential consequences caused such severe mental suffer-
ing that the Eighth Amendment precluded application of the punishment.'
The Trop Court recognized that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
punishments which (1) undermine human dignity"° or (2) violate society's
"evolving standards of decency" from which the Eighth Amendment derives
its meaning."1 Since the Trop decision, commentators have noted that con-
demned prisoners' mental suffering undermines human dignity"° and that
their prolonged psychological anguish violates society's standards of de-
cency.103  Trop, therefore, is a cornerstone in the Eighth Amendment
97. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (finding that punishment of denational-
ization inflicted severe mental suffering that violated Eighth Amendment). In Trop, the
Supreme Court considered whether denationalization violated the Eighth Amendment prohibi-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 99. The Trop Court noted that denationalization
stripped citizens of political status and exposed them to potentially disastrous consequences,
including discrimination and exile. Id. at 101. Additionally, the Court observed that the
punishment's severity subjected citizens to "a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress." Id.
at 102. The Court examined the Eighth Amendment's underlying rationale and found dena-
tionalization impermissibly cruel. Id. at 108-10. First, the Court noted that the Eighth
Amendment exists to ensure human dignity. Id. at 100. Next, the Court observed that the
Eighth Amendment is neither static nor precise, but draws meaning "from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 101. Because
denationalization's psychological consequences undermined human dignity and failed to
conform with societal standards of decency, the Trop Court held that denationalization
exceeded Eighth Amendment limits. Id.
98. Id. at 101.
99. See id. at 101-03 (finding denationalization unconstitutionally cruel because punish-
ment causes fear and severe psychological distress that violates Eighth Amendment).
100. Id. at 99.
101. Id. at 100-01. In discussing the Eighth Amendment, the Court noted that "the words
of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static [but] draw[s] ... meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id.;
see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (finding that Eighth Amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment "is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice").
102. See District Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1290-91, 1293 (Mass. 1980)
(Liacos, J., concurring) (finding mental anguish of death row prisoners degrading to human
dignity); see also People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal.) (stating that death penalty
process degrades and brutalizes condemned prisoners), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972),
superseded by constitutional amendment as stated in People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 984 (Cal.
1992); cf. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting
that onset of insanity while awaiting execution is not uncommon).
103. See Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1283 (finding that capital punishment fails to comport
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argument that prolonged psychological anguish renders the death penalty
unconstitutionally cruel."°
In 1972, the California Supreme Court interpreted Trop in .the capital
context presented by People v. Anderson." In Anderson, the California
court determined that capital punishment violated California's constitutional
prohibition of "cruel or unusual punishment."'°6 In reaching its decision,
the state supreme court first emphasized that the Eighth Amendment prohib-
its punishments resulting in severe mental suffering."° Next, the court
analogized denationalization's constitutionally impermissible psychological
effects to the experience of prisoners awaiting execution.'0 8 The court
determined that the dehumanizing effects of lengthy pre-execution confine-
ment contributed to capital punishment's cruelty. 109 Because condemned
prisoners inevitably undergo "psychological torture" during the lengthy
with contemporary standards of decency because of mental agony caused by death row
incarceration).
104. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-03 (1958) (determining that punishment vio-
lates Eighth Amendment when punishment causes mental suffering degrading to human
dignity or when punishment fails to conform with evolving standards of decency from which
Eighth Amendment derives meaning), quoted in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 289
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that condemned prisoners, like denationalized
citizens, suffer "fate of ever-increasing fear and distress"); Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1283
(using Trop's "contemporary standards of decency" test to evaluate constitutionality of mental
anguish that death row causes (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01)); see also Note, supra note
28, at 830 (analogizing mental suffering denationalization causes to mental suffering that death
row causes (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 101)).
105. 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
106. See Anderson, 493 P.2d at 895 (relying on Trop to prohibit capital punishment as
"cruel or unusual" within meaning of California Constitution (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 6)), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972), supersededby constitutional amendment as stated
in People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 984 (Cal. 1992). In Anderson, the California Supreme Court
considered whether capital punishment violated California's constitutional prohibition against
"cruel or unusual punishment." Anderson, 493 P.2d at 894 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 6). Although the court noted the cruelty of inflicting physical pain, id., the court primarily
focused on the psychological effects of death row delay. Id. The court observed that the
dehumanizing character of lengthy death row confinement undermined human dignity. Id.
The court also determined that the death penalty process had a degrading and brutalizing
psychological effect on condemned individuals. Id. Relying on Trop, the Anderson court
determined that condemned prisoners' mental suffering offended contemporary standards of
decency. Id. at 893, 895. Consequently, the court found capital punishment "cruel or
unusual punishment" within the meaning of the California Constitution. Id. at 898 (quoting
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6).
107. Id. at 895.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 894.
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process of carrying out a death sentence, 10 the court concluded that the
California Constitution prohibited capital punishment as unconstitutionally
cruel.
l u
In his concurrence to Furman v. Georgia,"' Justice Brennan relied on
the California Supreme Court's Anderson decision to find capital punish-
ment per se unconstitutional."' Justice Brennan observed that mental
anguish "exacts a frightful toll" on condemned prisoners.14  Drawing on
the constitutional values articulated in Trop,"5 Justice Brennan reinforced
the Anderson court's findings by concluding that the pre-execution mental
suffering experienced by condemned prisoners magnifies the severity of
capital punishment."
6
A United States Supreme Court majority has yet to recognize that the
mental suffering endured during prolonged death row confinement impli-
cates the Eighth Amendment."' However, a recent appellate decision
110. Id.
111. Id. at 895.
112. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
113. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 288 (1972) (Brennan, I. concurring) (noting
California Supreme Court's conclusion that death penalty process degrades condemned
prisoners and determining that unacceptable severity of death penalty hinges, in part, on
condemned prisoners' mental anguish (citing People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972), superseded by constitutional amendment as stated in People
v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 984 (Cal. 1992))). In Furman, the Court considered whether capital
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment when juries have unrestricted discretion to impose
either a sentence of life imprisonment or a death penalty. Id. at 238. The Court determined
that death sentences which juries render without sentencing guidance constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. All nine justices wrote separate opinions. Id. In his concurrence,
Justice Brennan concluded that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional because it degrades
human dignity. Id. at 285 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Brennan concurrence identified four
Eighth Amendment principles that determine whether a challenged punishment comports with
human dignity. Id. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring). First, a punishment should not be overly
severe. Id. at 271 (Brennan, J., concurring). Second, the state cannot arbitrarily inflict
punishment. Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring). Third, punishments must comport with the
views of contemporary society. Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 n.32 (1958)). Finally, punishments must be neither excessive nor unneces-
sary. Id. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring). Because capital punishment failed to satisfy any
of the four principles, Justice Brennan concluded that capital punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 285 (Brennan, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 287 (Brennan, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 270-79 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 n.32).
116. Id. at 287 (Brennan, J., concurring) (relying on Anderson and finding that unaccep-
table severity of death penalty hinges, in part, on condemned prisoners' mental anguish).
117. See Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421 (1995) (declining to consider death row
prisoner's claim that prolonged death row incarceration rendered execution cruel and unusual
punishment).
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rendered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the United
Kingdom (Privy Council) offers strong support for Lackey's Eighth Amend-
ment argument.118 In Pratt v. Attorney General,119 the Privy Council,
sitting en bane for the first time in fifty years, unanimously overturned the
death sentences of two inmates who had spent fourteen years on Jamaica's
death row.'1° The Privy Council found that execution after a fourteen-year
delay constituted "inhuman or degrading" punishment under the Jamaican
Constitution,121 a document rooted in the same English common-law tradi-
tion as the United States Constitution. " The Privy Council noted:
There is an instinctive revulsion against the prospect of [executing] a man
after he has been held under sentence of death for many years. What
gives rise to this instinctive revulsion? The answer can only be our
humanity: we regard it as an inhuman act to keep a man facing the agony
of execution over a long extended period of time."
Although the Privy Council focused primarily on the length of delay, 4 the
Council addressed a significant secondary theme - the state's setting and
118. See Pratt v. Attorney Gen., [1994] 2 App. Cas. 1 (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from
Jam.) (en bane) (finding death row delay of more than five years presumptively unconstitu-
tional), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 364, 386 (1994), noted in Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1422 (Stevens,
J., respecting denial of certiorari); see also infra note 128 and accompanying text (describing
Privy Council).
119. [1994] 2 App. Cas. 1 (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from Jam.) (en bane), reprinted in
33 I.L.M. 364 (1994).
120. Pratt, 33 I.L.M. at 386. In Pratt, the Privy Council considered whether Jamaica
could constitutionally inflict the death penalty on two prisoners who had spent 14 years on
death row. Id. at 364. Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan received death sentences in 1979. Id.
The prisoners exhausted their direct appeals in six years. Id. at 369-76. Subsequent applica-
tions for relief prolonged their death row stay until 1993. Id. In 1993, the Privy Council
determined that Jamaica could not execute the prisoners for two reasons. Id. at 384, 386.
First, the Privy Council found that the prisoners were not responsible for the inordinate delay.
Id. at 384. Specifically, the Privy Council found that the prisoners did not engage in dilatory
tactics and that the state could not fault the prisoners for time spent on legitimate appeals. Id.
Second, the Privy Council determined that the prisoners' prolonged incarceration caused a
psychological "agony of suspense." Id. The Privy Council reasoned that execution after such
agonizing delay constituted inhuman and degrading punishment. Id. Consequently, the Privy
Council commuted the prisoners' death sentences to life imprisonment. Id.
121. Id. at 384.
122. Id. at 365-66; see supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing historical
link between English common law and Eighth Amendment that suggests English common law
and Eighth Amendment share similar values).
123. Pratt, 33 I.L.M. at 380.
124. See id. at 380-86 (considering length of delay and determining that state caused
challenged delay).
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withdrawing numerous execution dates."z The Privy Council determined that
the repeated rescheduling of execution dates contributed to the psychological
cruelty of delay, provoking a veritable "agony of suspense."'6 Conse-
quently, the Privy Council decided that a strong presumption of constitutional
invalidity exists in capital cases when more than five years have passed since
sentencing. 127
Pratt has a twofold significance: First, the American judiciary has tradi-
tionally regarded Privy Council opinions as persuasive authority. 1 There-
fore, Pratt may lead to judicial recognition of a condemned prisoner's severe
mental suffering during protracted death row confinement."2 9 Second, the
Privy Council's decision draws authority from the English common law.130
The historical connection between the Eighth Amendment and the English
common law indicates that the bodies of law have similar values.' As such,
Pratt recognizes a value that the English common law and the Eighth
Amendment conceivably share.132 Thus, the Privy Council's decision in
Pratt may foreshadow an evolution in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
125. See id. at 365-66 (finding that reading of death warrants on three separate occa-
sions produced psychological agony in prisoners and noting that brutal psychological impact
of protracted death row confinement "only reveals that which is to be expected").
126. Id. at 384; see also District Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1290 n.5
(Mass. 1980) (Liacos, J., concurring) (commenting that lengthy delays, especially if
punctuated by series of last-minute reprieves, intensify condemned prisoners' mental suffer-
ing (citing West, supra note 27, at 291)).
127. See Pratt, 33 I.L.M. at 387 (finding that death row delays exceeding five years
are presumptively unconstitutional).
128. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980) (citing Privy Council
decision with approval); Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 488 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (noting that "[tlhis Court in reviewing a conviction for murder.., ought not
to be behind ... the Privy Council"); Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 186 (1881)
(citing Privy Council decision with approval); see also TERENCE INGMAN, THE ENGLISH
LEGAL PRocEss 90-92 (4th ed. 1992) (describing Privy Council). The Privy Council is the
highest appellate court for Commonwealth nations, which include Malaysia, New Zealand,
Jamaica, and Trinidad. Id. at 91. The jurists who sit on the Privy Council are members
of England's highest domestic appellate court, the House of Lords. Id. at 90.
129. Cf. Fisher, 328 U.S. at 488 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (urging Court to keep
pace with Privy Council decisions).
130. See Pratt, 33 I.L.M. at 365-66 (appeal taken from Jam.) (en banc) (noting that
Jamaican Constitution is product of English common law).
131. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing historical link between
English common law and Eighth Amendment that suggests English common law and Eighth
Amendment share similar values).
132. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (arguing that legal basis for Privy
Council's Pratt decision stems from antecedents of Eighth Amendment and that Eighth
Amendment may therefore share similar legal values).
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IV. Procedural Issues
Before a court will explore the substantive issues underlying a Lackey
claim, the claim must withstand procedural scrutiny. Lackey claims raise
two distinct procedural questions that, to date, have thwarted review on the
merits."' First, the claim arguably proposes a new constitutional rule.M The
Supreme Court has prohibited retroactive application of new constitutional
rules in cases on collateral review, 35 the stage at which prisoners raise
Lackey claims.1 36 Lackey claimants can avoid the Court's new-rule prohibi-
tion by showing (1) that the claim neither collaterally attacks a final judgment
nor proposes a new rule137 or (2) that certain narrow exceptions apply. 
138
The second procedural hurdle facing Lackey claimants is the doctrine of
abuse of the habeas writ. 139 Raising a new claim in a second or subsequent
habeas petition implicates the abuse of the writ doctrine. 14 Because the
133. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Eighth
Amendment delay claim as Teague-barred); Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th
Cir. 1996) (rejecting Lackey claim as barred by abuse of habeas writ doctrine); Stafford v.
Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 926 (4th
Cir. 1995) (same); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Fearance
v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); Lackey v. Scott, 52 F.3d 98, 100 (5th
Cir. 1995) (rejecting Eighth Amendment delay claim as Teague-barred); Free v. Peters, 50
P.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting Lackey claim as barred by abuse of habeas writ
doctrine); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995) (same).
134. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (explaining that courts construe
Lackey as proposing new or novel rule).
135. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (noting that Court prohibits retroac-
tive application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure to cases on collateral
review).
136. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 1996) (raising Lackey
claim in first federal habeas petition); Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir.
1996) (raising Lackey claim in second federal habeas petition); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924,
925 (4th Cir. 1995) (raising Lackey claim in fourth federal habeas petition); McKenzie v.
Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995) (raising Lackey claim in third federal habeas
petition); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1995) (raising Lackey claim in third
federal habeas petition after three collateral reviews at state level); Porter v. Singletary, 49
F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995) (raising Lackey claim in second federal habeas petition).
137. See infra notes 150-59 and accompanying text (demonstrating that Lackey claim
neither attacks trial court error nor proposes new constitutional rule of criminal procedure).
138. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text (showing that Lackey claims fall
within retroactivity doctrine's exceptions).
139. See, e.g., Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028-29 (10th Cir. 1995) (determining
that habeas petitioner's Lackey claim implicated abuse of writ doctrine); Turner v. Jabe, 58
F.3d 924, 929 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 636-38 (5th Cir.
1995) (same); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (1lth Cir. 1995) (same).
140. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470 (1991) (prohibiting habeas petitioners
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factual predicate for a Lackey claim is the accrual of substantial death row
delay, a prisoner typically will submit multiple habeas petitions prior to filing
a Lackey claim."I Lackey claimants can skirt writ abuse only by demonstrat-
ing that adequate cause and prejudice exist.142
A. The Prohibition of Retroactive Application of a
New Constitutional Rule
In Teague v. Lane, 43 the Supreme Court prohibited the retroactive
application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure in cases when
judgment is final. 44 If a petitioner's postconviction claim proposes an
from raising new claims in second or subsequent habeas petitions). The Court noted:
The concept of "abuse of the writ" is founded on the equitable nature of habeas
corpus. Thus, where a prisoner files a petition raising grounds that were avail-
able but not relied upon in a previous petition ... the court may dismiss the
subsequent petition on the ground that the prisoner has abused the writ.
Id. See generally JOSEPHNE R. PoTuTo, PRISONER COLLATERAL ATTACKS: FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS AND FEDERAL PRISONER MOTION PRACTICE § 2:34, at 97 (1991) (explain-
ing abuse of habeas writ doctrine).
141. See, e.g., Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1996) (raising Lackey
claim in second federal habeas petition); Turner, 58 F.3d at 925 (raising Lackey claim in
fourth federal habeas petition); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995)
(raising Lackey claim in third federal habeas petition); Fearance, 56 F.3d at 635 (raising
Lackey claim in third federal habeas petition after three collateral reviews at state level);
Porter, 49 F.3d at 1485 (raising Lackey claim in second federal habeas petition).
142. See infra notes 176-83 and accompanying text (discussing abuse of writ doctrine's
cause and prejudice exception).
143. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
144. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (determining that courts cannot
retroactively apply new constitutional rules of criminal procedure to cases on collateral
review). In Teague, an all-white jury convicted the African-American petitioner of numer-
ous offenses. Id. at 292-93. During jury selection, the prosecutor used all peremptory
challenges to exclude African-Americans from the jury. Id. at 293. The petitioner argued
that the jury should represent a cross-section of the population. Id. After an unsuccessful
state court appeal, the petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus petition and argued that the
Court's recent opinions invited re-examination of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965),
which articulated the necessary evidentiary showing for racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges. Teague, 489 U.S. at 293. The court of appeals voted to rehear the case after
the Court issued Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Teague, 489 U.S. at 294. Ulti-
mately, Batson overruled the portion of Swain articulating the evidentiary showing necessary
to demonstrate racially discriminatory peremptory challenges. Id. However, the court of
appeals determined that the petitioner could not benefit from Batson because Allan v. Hardy,
478 U.S. 255 (1986) (per curiam), determined that courts could not retroactively apply
Batson to cases on collateral review. Teague, 489 U.S. at 294. The Court affirmed the
court of appeals' decision. Id. at 316. The Court concluded that Allan prevented the peti-
tioner from benefitting from Batson's new rule because the petitioner's conviction became
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obligation that precedent does not dictate, courts will find that a "new rule"
exists and reject the claim as Teague-barred.45 Teague creates two problems
for Lackey claimants."4 First, most of a Lackey claimant's challenged delay
accrues after a court has rendered final judgment. 47 Second, precedent does
not dictate judicial recognition of a Lackey claim.' Although the Teague
landscape may appear bleak for Lackey claimants, courts have disagreed over
the doctrine's relevance in the Lackey context.149
Lackey claimants arguably evade application of Teague because Teague's
new-rule doctrine bears solely upon collateral recognition of new constitu-
final before the Court decided Batson. Id. The Court determined that, in the interests of
comity and finality, Id. at 308, courts must prohibit retroactive application of a new consti-
tutional criminal procedure rule in cases on collateral review unless the rule falls into one
of the following exceptions: First, an exception exists if the rule places certain kinds of
primary conduct beyond the power of criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe. Id. at 307
(citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)). Second, an exception exists
if the rule requires the observance of those procedures "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693). Finally, the Court determined that
under the Court's retroactivity jurisprudence, petitioners cannot use habeas corpus review
to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless the rule falls within one of
the two Teague exceptions. Id. at 316.
145. See PorTro, supra note 140, § 2:16, at 63 (stating that "a rule is new although it
resolves a question in the precedent or advances the precedent in a way that may have been
suggested by the precedent; the rule is new because it was not dictated by the precedent");
see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241 (1990) (determining that new rule exists even
if it resolves question in manner "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds"); Saffle
v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488-90 (1990) (finding existence of new rule despite rule's founda-
tion in prior case law).
146. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Eighth
Amendment delay claim as Teague-barred); Lackey v. Scott, 52 F.3d 98, 100 (5th Cir.
1995) (same); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995) (same).
147. See Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 925 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting petitioner's claim
that inordinate postconviction delay violated Eighth Amendment); McKenzie v. Day, 57
F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that Lackey claims address constitutionality of
postconviction delay); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1995) (same).
148. See White, 79 F.3d at 438 (commenting that Lackey claimant could "point to no
precedent . . . that would require the district court to grant [claimant] habeas relief if it
finds that he has remained on death row for 17 years due to the fault of the state'); Stafford
v. State, 899 P.2d 657, 660 (Okla. Crim. App.) (rejecting Lackey claim because United
States Supreme Court and three federal circuit courts of appeals refused to grant relief on
Lackey claims), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2640 (1995).
149. Compare McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1468 n.15 (finding application of Teague to Lackey
claim inappropriate because Lackey claim "cannot be raised on direct appeal because much
of the delay complained of arises in post-conviction proceedings"), with Lackey v. Scott,
52 F.3d at 100 (determining that petitioner's Eighth Amendment delay claim proposed new
constitutional rule of criminal procedure and finding claim barred on collateral review by
Teague).
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tional rules of criminal procedure.'5 ° Although prisoners raise Lackey claims
collaterally through habeas petitions,' these claims do not attack the consti-
tutionality of initial state court proceedings, but instead seek relief for the
state's postjudgment action." Because the Eighth Amendment claim does
not collaterally attack a final judgment, but demands relief for a postcon-
viction constitutional wrong, Lackey petitions should escape Teague's bar."
Moreover, Lackey claimants do not propose a new rule of constitutional
criminal procedure. 5 Rather, substantive criminal law provides the basis
for Lackey claims. 5
A closer look at the principles informing Teague reveals that Teague's
new-rule prohibition should not apply to claims that prisoners could not have
raised on direct appeal. 56 In essence, equitable principles underlie the
Teague doctrine.'57 Using Teague to bar claims whose factual predicates do
150. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (barring retroactive application of
new rules of constitutional criminal procedure to cases on collateral review).
151. See, e.g., White, 79 F.3d at 436 (raising Lackey claim through petition for writ
of habeas corpus); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028-29 (10th Cir. 1995) (same);
Turner, 58 F.3d at 929 (same); McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1463 (same); Fearance, 56 F.3d at
636-38 (same); Porter, 49 F.3d at 1485 (same).
152. See, e.g., Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting
petitioner's claim that inordinate postconviction delay violated Eighth Amendment); Turner,
58 F.3d at 925 (same); McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1463 (noting that factual predicate of Lackey
claim largely relies on postconviction delay); Fearance, 56 F.3d at 635 (same). See
generally Teague, 489 U.S. at 305, 307 (noting that new-rule prohibition exclusively applies
to cases attacking final judgment).
153. See cases cited supra note 152 (showing that Lackey claims do not attack convic-
tion or final judgment but instead challenge constitutionality of delay incurred after convic-
tion or final judgment).
154. See Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421-22 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of
certiorari) (suggesting that Lackey claim raises substantive Eighth Amendment claim); see
also United States v. Sood, 969 F.2d 774, 776 (9th Cir. 1992) (commenting that
"Teague... dealt with the retroactive application of a 'new constitutional rule of criminal
procedure,' not with the application of decisions affecting the substance of criminal laws"
(citation omitted)); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 48-49, Turner v. Jabe (Va. May
22, 1995) (No. 95-0777) (noting that Lackey claim does not propose new rule of criminal
procedure, but asserts substantive guarantees of Eighth Amendment).
155. See authorities cited supra note 154 (showing that Lackey claim proposes applica-
tion of substantive law).
156. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1468 n.15 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that
Teague is inapplicable to Lackey claim because prisoners typically cannot raise Lackey claim
on direct appeal).
157. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308-10 (1995) (noting that fairness concerns
underlie Teague's doctrine of retroactivity). In Teague, the Court intended to promote final-
ity in the judicial process and therefore determined that habeas courts are only responsible
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not arise on direct appeal is neither fair nor equitable.15 Thus, judicial
application of the new-rule prohibition to Lackey claims conflicts with
Teague's underlying rationale. 15 9
Two narrow exceptions to Teague should also provide relief for Lackey
claimants."W First, courts will permit a new rule's retroactive application if
the rule's effect places a certain defendant class outside a specific punish-
ment's reach.' Under such circumstances, the Constitution deprives the
state of power to inflict certain penalties on particular defendants. 16 Because
Lackey claims propose that lengthy death row incarceration renders a class
of death row prisoners constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty, 63 such
for discovering constitutional errors in the original proceeding and in its direct appeal. Id.
at 306. At bottom, however, Teague's retroactivity doctrine is rooted in fairness concerns,
as well as principles of federalism and finality. Id. at 308-10. Because Lackey claims hinge
on factual predicates unavailable at the time of the original proceeding and its direct appeal,
courts should recognize that application of the new-rule bar conflicts with Teague's underly-
ing equitable principles.
158. See supra note 157 (showing that Teague's underlying equitable principles allow
courts to hear claims whose factual predicates do not arise on direct appeal).
159. See supra note 157 (explaining that new-rule prohibition should not apply to
Lackey claims because prohibition conflicts with Teague's underlying equitable principles).
160. See PoTuro, supra note 140, § 4:8, at 135 (noting that Teague permits retroactive
application of new constitutional rule in two circumstances).
161. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989) (determining that courts may
apply new rule on collateral review if new rule prohibits particular punishments for certain
class of defendants). Under the first exception to Teague, courts may announce and apply
new rules on collateral review that "prohibit[ ] a certain category of punishment for a class
of defendants because of their status or offense." Id. The Penry Court explained:
In our view, a new rule placing a certain class of individuals beyond the State's
power to punish by death is analogous to a new rule placing certain conduct
beyond the State's power to punish at all. In both cases, the Constitution itself
deprives the State of the power to impose a certain penalty and the finality and
comity concerns underlying [the Court's doctrine of] retroactivity have little
force .... Therefore, the first exception [to Teague] ... should be understood
to cover not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary
conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of
defendants because of their status or offense.
Id.
162. Id.; see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (finding that although
petitioner proposed new constitutional rule on collateral review, Eighth Amendment pro-
hibited state from inflicting death penalty on insane prisoners); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977) (finding that although petitioner proposed new constitutional rule on col-
lateral review, Eighth Amendment prohibited state from inflicting death penalty on prisoners
convicted of rape).
163. See, e.g., Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1027 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting pris-
oner's argument that Eighth Amendment prohibits execution after protracted death row
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claims should escape Teague's bar under this exception." Second, Teague
doctrine permits retroactive application of new rules concerning bed-
rock constitutional principles "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'"
The Lackey claim rests on the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment, a fundamental constitutional guarantee."6 Thus,
Lackey claims also should evade Teague under this second exception. 7
B. Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
During postconviction review, prisoners may raise claims of constitu-
tional error collaterally through the petition for writ of habeas corpus."
A habeas petitioner who brings a new claim in a second or subsequent
habeas application must overcome the abuse of the writ doctrine. 6 9 Abuse
confinement); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 926 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); McKenzie v. Day,
57 F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir.
1995) (same); Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); Porter v.
Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995) (same).
164. Cf. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410 (determining on collateral review that Eighth Amend-
ment prohibited infliction of death penalty on insane prisoners); Coker, 433 U.S. at 592
(determining on collateral review that Eighth Amendment prohibited infliction of death
penalty on prisoners convicted of rape). But see White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 438 (5th
Cir. 1996) (rejecting argument that Lackey claimant fell within Teague's first exception
because claimant's "proposed 'class' has no innate characteristics such as insanity or mental
retardation . . . and is not made up of individuals whose conduct was not eligible for
punishment by death at the time of sentencing"); POTUTro, supra note 140, § 4:8, at 135
(stating that "it will be the rare cases in which a petitioner may be able to rely on [the first]
Teague exception").
165. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (discussing second exception
to Teague (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989))).
166. See Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421-22 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of
certiorari) (suggesting that Lackey claim raises substantive Eighth Amendment claim);
.see also United States v. Sood, 969 F.2d 774, 776 (9th Cir. 1992) (commenting that
"Teague ... dealt with the retroactive application of a 'new constitutional rule of criminal
procedure,' not with the application of decisions affecting the substance of criminal laws"
(citation omitted)); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 48-49, Turner v. Jabe (Va. May
22, 1995) (No. 95-0777) (noting that Lackey claim does not propose new rule of criminal
procedure, but concerns substantive guarantees under Eighth Amendment).
167. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (arguing that Lackey claim falls
within Teague's first exception).
168. See LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVIC'ION REMEDIES 15 (1981) (noting that
prisoner can request habeas relief if state-obtained conviction violated Constitution).
169. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470 (1991) (stating that "where a prisoner
files a petition raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a previous peti-
tion ... the court may dismiss the subsequent petition on the ground that the prisoner has
abused the writ").
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of the writ applies if a court determines that the petitioner has inexcusably
neglected to raise a claim earlier. 7
The abuse of the writ doctrine poses a formidable hurdle for Lackey
claimants."' By definition, a prisoner must accrue substantial death row
time before a Lackey claim is ripe for review."7 However, a prisoner
typically will file interim habeas petitions before accumulating the delay
necessary to support a Lackey claim. 73 A Catch-22 situation thus arises:
The claim is nonjusticiable on ripeness grounds before the passage of sub-
stantial time, 74 but courts may bar the claim as untimely if a later habeas
petition raises it.75
170. PoTtrro, supra note 140, § 2:34, at 97. Although "inexcusable neglect" describes
the standard for abuse of the writ, certain U.S. Supreme Court members have supported a
narrower standard. Id. Under the Kuhnann standard, a court will dismiss a prisoner's
subsequent petition unless the prisoner can show that the alleged constitutional infringement
represented "a colorable claim of factual innocence." Id. (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477
U.S. 436, 438, 448-54 (1986)).
171. See, e.g., Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding Lackey
claimant inexcusably abused habeas writ); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1027 (10th Cir.
1995) (same); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 926 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); McKenzie v. Day,
57 F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir.
1995) (same); Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); Porter v.
Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995) (same). Readers should also note that
ATEDA now imposes significant limitations on the power of federal courts to hear suc-
cessive petitions for habeas corpus. See Raymond, supra note 19, at 52-56 (discussing
ATEDA's restrictions on habeas petitions).
172. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1465, 1468 n.15 (9th Cir. 1995) (comment-
ing that Lackey claimant's challenged delay arose in postconviction proceedings and noting
that petitioner's claim "did not accrue until substantial time had passed after imposition of
the sentence").
173. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 1996) (raising Lackey
claim in first federal habeas petition); Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir.
1996) (raising Lackey claim in second federal habeas petition); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924,
925 (4th Cir. 1995) (raising Lackey claim in fourth federal habeas petition); McKenzie, 57
F.3d at 1463 (raising Lackey claim in third federal habeas petition); Fearance v. Scott, 56
F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1995) (raising Lackey claim in third federal habeas petition after
three collateral reviews at state level); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir.
1995) (raising Lackey claim in second federal habeas petition).
174. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1468 (noting that factual predicate for Lackey claim is
substantial death row delay).
175. POTUTO, supra note 140, § 2:34, at 97; see Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155,
1160 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that petitioner raised Lackey claim in second federal habeas
petition and that petitioner "could have raised this claim in his first habeas corpus petition
filed in... 1992"); McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1464 (stating that petitioner raised Lackey claim
in third federal habeas petition and that claim "could have been brought much earlier, quite
possibly as early as [petitioner's] first and second federal habeas petitions"); Fearance v.
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Courts will excuse abuse of the writ only if a petitioner demonstrates
adequate cause and prejudice. 76 The prior absence of a factual or legal
basis for a newly raised claim will adequately establish cause." Because
a Lackey claim does not factually ripen until after substantial delay, 7 ' a
Lackey claimant arguably shows adequate cause when the absence of delay
barred the petitioner from raising the claim earlier.' Moreover, the
Lackey claim also may have lacked a legal basis"8 until April 26, 1995,
when Clarence Lackey's claim received the imprimatur of the Court.",
Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 636 (5th Cir. 1995) (determining that Lackey claim "could and should
have been asserted" in petitioner's first federal habeas petition).
176. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991) (discussing exception to
abuse of writ doctrine). In McCleskey, the Court determined that "ltlo excuse his failure
to raise the claim earlier, petitioner must show cause for failing to raise it and prejudice
therefrom." Id.
177. See Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1988) (finding adequate cause to
overcome abuse of writ if "factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available
to counsel" when petitioner filed earlier habeas petition (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 492 (1986))); POTUTO, supra note 140, § 4:6, at 132 (stating that petitioner
demonstrates adequate cause if petitioner can show that claim's factual or legal basis was
not reasonably available when petitioner filed earlier habeas petition).
178. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that Lackey
claim's factual predicate requires substantial death row delay).
179. See Amadeo, 486 U.S. at 222 (noting that petitioner demonstrates adequate cause
on showing that factual basis for newly raised claim was unavailable when petitioner filed
previous habeas petition); see also Murray, 477 U.S. at 492 (determining that cause
"requires a showing of some external impediment preventing counsel from constructing or
raising the claim').
180. See Amadeo, 486 U.S. at 222 (noting that petitioner demonstrates adequate cause
on showing that legal basis for newly raised claim was unavailable when petitioner filed
previous habeas petition); see also Murray, 477 U.S. at 492 (determining that petitioner
shows cause when external impediment prevented petitioner from raising claims earlier).
181. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1485 (Norris, J., dissenting) (noting that Lackey claim
appeared to receive imprimatur of full Court on April 27, 1995 when Court "entered a stay
of Lackey's execution pending the district court's consideration of petitioner's petition for
writ of habeas corpus"). Although only Justices Stevens and Breyer supported further study
of the Lackey claim on March 27, 1995, see Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421-22
(1995) (Stevens, J., ,respecting denial of certiorari), the claim has arguably received the
imprimatur of the entire Court, see Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1818, 1818 (1995)
(overruling Fifth Circuit's revocation of district court's stay of execution and ordering
district court consideration of Lackey's habeas petition). After Clarence Lackey raised an
Eighth Amendment claim challenging the constitutionality of his prolonged death row stay,
the Court stayed Lackey's execution. Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1274, 1274 (1995). On
March 27, 1995, the Court issued its denial of certiorari accompanied by Justice Stevens's
memorandum, with which Justice Breyer agreed. Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. at 1421
(Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). Clarence Lackey immediately filed a second
PROTRACTED DEATH ROW CONFINEMENT
Therefore, prisoners who raise Lackey claims in second or subsequent peti-
tions may argue that the absence of either a factual predicate" or legal
authority" posed an impediment to raising the claim earlier.
To date, Lackey claimants have been unable to overcome abuse of the
writ through the cause and prejudice exception."8 Habeas courts have con-
federal habeas petition in federal district court and raised the same Eighth Amendment
claim. Lackey v. Scott, 885 F. Supp. 958, 964 (W.D. Tex. 1995). The district court
granted a stay of execution to consider the claim fully. Id. (order granting stay of execu-
tion pending consideration of Lackey's Eighth Amendment claim). On April 26, 1995, the
Fifth Circuit found Lackey's claim Teague-barred and vacated the district court's stay of
execution. Lackey v. Texas, 52 F.3d 98, 99 (5th Cir. 1995). A day later, the Supreme
Court overruled the Fifth Circuit's vacatur and issued, without dissent, its own stay of
execution "pending the district court's consideration of [Lackey's] petition for habeas
corpus." Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1818. The Court's issuance of the April 27, 1995 stay
confirms Justices Stevens's and Breyer's opinion that the Eighth Amendment claim is both
"important and undecided." Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421-22 (Stevens, J., respecting denial
of certiorari).
182. See Amadeo, 486 U.S. at 222 (noting that petitioner demonstrates adequate cause
on showing that factual basis for newly raised claim was unavailable when petitioner filed
previous habeas petition).
183. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1480 (9th Cir. 1995) (Norris, J., dissenting)
(stating that Lackey petitioner lacked plausible legal basis for bringing Eighth Amendment
delay claim before events in Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421 (1995) (Stevens, J., respect-
ing denial of certiorari)). But see infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (discussing
argument that Lackey claims had plausible legal basis as early as 1960).
184. See Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that Lackey
claimant abused writ and failed to show cause); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 925 (4th Cir.
1995) (finding that Lackey claimant inexcusably abused habeas writ). In Turner, the Fourth
Circuit determined that Lackey petitioner Willie Lloyd Turner failed to show sufficient cause
to overcome abuse of the habeas writ. Id. at 931. The court of appeals rejected Turner's
contention that his claim could not have been raised earlier for lack of necessary factual
predicates. Id. The court determined that Turner could have raised an equally ripe Lackey
claim in a habeas petition filed four years earlier. Id. at 925, 930. The Fourth Circuit
divided Turner's ripeness defense into two parts: temporal (length of stay) and nontemporal
(allegedly torturous conditions of confinement). Id. at 930. The court of appeals noted that
although Turner could have claimed only twelve years of torturous confinement if he had
raised his Lackey claim in 1991, twelve years would have been sufficient to support a
Lackey claim. Id. The Fourth Circuit rejected the nontemporal components of Turner's
Eighth Amendment claim, including his transfer to the death chamber on three separate
occasions, exposure to the odor of executed prisoners' burnt flesh, isolation on death row,
and psychological abuse by guards. Id. The court of appeals found that these factual
predicates for Turner's claim of unconstitutional prison conditions existed when Turner filed
his first and second habeas petitions. Id. The court concluded that allowing Turner's
Lackey claim to proceed would encourage prisoners to raise claims on the eve of execution.
Id.; see also Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that petitioner
failed to show cause adequate to overcome abuse of habeas writ); Porter v. Singletary, 49
F.3d 1483, 1485 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (same).
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cluded that the claim lacks persuasive value and, therefore, that the absence
of a Lackey claim's factual predicate is irrelevant." Courts have also
determined that the legal underpinnings of a Lackey claim are not novel and
that a reasonable basis for such a claim existed prior to the issuance of the
Lackey Memorandum.' 86 Consequently, prisoners who have raised Lackey
claims in subsequent habeas petitions have been unable to argue that the
absence of legal authority posed an external impediment to raising the claim
earlier. 1 7
185. See White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that petitioner's
Eighth Amendment delay claim lacked persuasive value); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025,
1027 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting habeas petitioner's Lackey claim for failure to demonstrate
cause adequate to overcome abuse of habeas writ). In reaching its decision, the Tenth
Circuit noted:
There is no reported case that has adopted the position advocated by Appellant.
Although two Supreme Court justices have expressed the view that lower federal
courts should grapple with this issue, those views do not constitute an endorse-
ment of the legal theory, which has never commanded an affirmative statement
by any justice, let alone a majority of the court.
Id. at 1028; see also Stafford v. State, 899 P.2d 657, 660 (Okla. Crim. App.) (commenting
that "[t]he United States Supreme Court and three federal circuit courts have refused to
grant relief on this issue... we are not inclined to review the claim based on the memoran-
dum opinion of a single Justice"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2640 (1995).
186. See Turner, 58 F.3d at 927-28 (determining that legal basis for Lackey claim was
not novel and concluding that petitioner could have raised claim earlier). In Turner, the
Fourth Circuit claimed that the legal theory behind Lackey's Eighth Amendment argument
existed in 1983 and that it may have existed as early as 1960. Id. The court of appeals
corrected the district court's reading of Justice Stevens's Lackey Memorandum and con-
cluded that Justice Stevens's characterization of Lackey as raising a "novel" issue did not
apply in the context of a cause inquiry. See id. at 929 (commenting that "[p]erhaps by
'novel,' [Justice Stevens] simply meant 'undecided'"); see also McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1465
(finding that Lackey petitioner failed to show cause adequate to overcome abuse of habeas
writ and noting that "[w]hile Justice Stevens's memorandum in Lackey has given new
prominence to the argument that delay in carrying out a death sentence constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment, the legal theory underlying the claim is not new").
187. See cases cited supra note 186 (noting that courts have determined that Lackey
claim's legal underpinnings are not novel). Compare Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16, 17
(1984) (determining that, under abuse of writ cause inquiry, omission of claim is excusable
only if claim is so novel that it lacked reasonable basis in existing law), and Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 129-30, 133 n.41 (1982) (noting that claim has reasonable basis in existing
law if petitioner had legal tools with which to formulate claim, even if claim is likely to be
futile, and determining that petitioner cannot show cause if other lawyers have previously
perceived and litigated same claim), with Turner, 58 F.3d at 927-28 (demonstrating that
claims like Clarence Lackey's existed as early as 1960), and McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1480-81
(commenting that petitioners litigated claims like Clarence Lackey's, albeit unsuccessfully,
in 1980s). But see Reed, 468 U.S. at 16 (determining that courts cannot require defense
counsel to bring all "remotely plausible constitutional claims that could, someday, gain
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V. Policy Implications
Although protracted death row confinement followed by execution
arguably violates the Eighth Amendment, 8 ' some delay is clearly necessary
to provide capital defendants with due process. 8 9 One commentator notes:
A legalistic society will be unable to impose the death penalty without
an unconstitutionally cruel delay, and hence it will be unable lawfully
to impose the death penalty at all. It must, at the very least, be ac-
cepted by societies committed to due process of law and the rule of law
that a death sentence becomes unconstitutionally cruel unless carried
out within a reasonable time after it has been awarded, and without the
incidental infringement of any of the other rights (such as the right to
appeal against conviction and sentence) guaranteed by due process.
What constitutes a "reasonable time" is a matter for debate. But one
should not forget the degree of agony inflicted on a human being with
each day of delay."9
Despite the inevitable delays caused by adequate due process, it is unlikely
that Lackey claims will inspire courts to find capital punishment per se
unconstitutional on the basis of unconstitutionally cruel delay.' Instead,
judicial recognition of Lackey claims is more likely to trigger (1) a stream-
lined capital appeals system or (2) an attribution-of-delay calculus that holds
prisoners responsible for delays incurred through discretionary appeals.
Should the American judiciary choose to recognize Lackey claims, however,
the courts must fashion an appropriate remedy.
recognition" and noting that to do so would require "counsel on appeal... [to] be obliged
to raise and argue every conceivable constitutional claim, no matter how far-fetched, in
order to preserve a right for postconviction relief upon some future, unforeseen development
in the law"); McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1480-81 (Norris, J., dissenting) (stating that "the fact
that the claim was not completely unheard of, and had been raised.., is not sufficient to
show that counsel engaged in manipulative behavior in declining to bring it previously").
188. See supra notes 39-132 and accompanying text (discussing why prolonged death
row delay is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment).
189. See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952-53 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring
in denial of certiorari) ("However critical one may be of... protracted post-trial proce-
dures, it seems inevitable that there must be a significant period of incarceration on death
row during the interval between sentencing and execution."); Ira P. Robbins, Toward a
More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
1, 14, 42 (1990) (commenting that American Bar Association Task Force on Habeas Reform
found some delay in capital cases necessary to ensure complete and adequate review).
190. DAvID PANNICK, JUDICIAL REvIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY 84 (1982).
191. But see id. (observing that societies committed to ideas of procedural fairness and
due process are not able to impose death penalty).
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A. Streamlined Capital Appeals
Courts have noted that constitutionally cognizable claims of delay may
provide incentive to streamline the capital appeals process."9 Currently,
the capital appellate process provides several layers of judicial review to
ensure discovery of trial court error."w Lackey raises the legitimate concern
that courts will truncate necessary appellate review to foil claims of uncon-
stitutional delay."
Streamlining capital appeals would result in less meaningful judicial
review and in accelerated rates of execution. 1 An expedited capital
appeals process not only increases the risk of error, 96 but also fatally dis-
advantages death row petitioners, the majority of whom rely on overworked
volunteer legal services." 9 In such an environment, courts could decline
to grant defense counsel necessary stays and postponements for fear that the
state later would lose its ability to enforce a death sentence.'98 Restricted
192. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that judicial
recognition of Eighth Amendment delay claims could acceleratepace of future executions);
cf. Turner v. Jabe, No. 95-530-A, slip op. at 12 (E.D. Va. May 22, 1995) (noting that Lack-
ey's "time is of the essence" emphasis places perverse incentives on criminal justice system).
193. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Special Report: The Death Penalty in America - In
Favorem Mortis, 14 HUM. RTS. 14, 14-16 (1987) (detailing capital case postconviction
review at following levels: state appellate court, federal district court, federal circuit court
of appeals, and federal supreme court). But see Raymond, supra note 19, at 52-53 (noting
that ATEDA compromises capital appellate review).
194. See cases cited supra note 192 (noting that judicial recognition of Eighth Amend-
ment delay claims could accelerate pace of future executions).
195. C. Coleman v. McCormick, 847 F.2d 1280, 1292-94 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(Reinhard, J., concurring) (commenting that curtailment of federal habeas procedure would
undermine system of justice and could result in hasty execution of persons possibly innocent
of death penalty).
196. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467 (noting that "most... procedural safeguards have
been imposed by the Supreme Court in recognition of the fact that the common law practice
of imposing swift and certain executions could result in arbitrariness and error in carrying
out the death sentence"); Amsterdam, supra note 193, at 51 (commenting that expedited
capital appeals process "could adversely affect the fairness and reliability of adjudication,
both by requiring lawyers to present their cases with less preparation and by requiring
judges to decide them with less deliberation").
197. See Amsterdam, supra note 193, at 51 (noting that capital defense lawyers are, "in
almost every case, either (1) unpaid volunteers who are struggling to accommodate the
hundreds of hours that must go into adequate representation of a capital client, with their
continuing responsibilities to their other clients (including those whose fees pay the bills),
or (2) one of the very small corps of [overworked] specialized pro bono death penalty
defense attorneys").
198. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that although
courts have generally erred on side of caution in granting stays of execution, courts would
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capital appellate options could ultimately result in the unconstitutional exe-
cution of death row defendants.199
Because capital punishment is qualitatively different from all other
punishments,' the Court has determined that the imposition of the death
penalty requires extraordinary procedural safeguards."' Human fallibility
and the finality of the death sentence have led the Court to demand pains-
taking judicial review in capital cases.' Because an expedited capital
appellate process conflicts with the Court's mandate of conscientious judi-
be reluctant to grant stays if aware that action could later impair state's interest in carrying
out death sentence).
199. Cf. McCormick, 847 F.2d at 1292-94 (finding condemned prisoner innocent of
death penalty 13 years after court imposed death sentence). Judge Reinhard commented:
Despite glaring deficiencies, it was not until thirteen years and thirteen court pro-
ceedings that we finally granted relief .... These peripatetic passages through
our legal system have raised serious questions about both habeas corpus and the
practicality of the death penalty. Critics of the former have argued that the
extended process undermines judicial finality and threatens the efficient functioning
of the federal courts. Some have even suggested that the writ be streamlined or
abolished .... I believe that the substantial constitutional issues raised by defen-
dants... are much more than "arcane niceties," [and] I would conclude that the
mockery of our criminal justice system lies not in repetitive federal review but in
the persistent disregard by our [state] courts of fundamental constitutional rights.
Id. (citing and quoting Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 951 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting)).
200. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(observing that death is qualitatively "different" from all other punishments because of its
finality and commenting that death sentence differs more from life imprisonment than 100-
year terms differ from sentences of one or two years); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
181-88 (1976) (plurality opinion) (noting that death differs from any other kind of punish-
ment imposed in United States); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-91 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (same).
201. See Balkcom, 451 U.S. at 952-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)
(noting that irrevocability of death sentence requires strict adherence to procedural safe-
guards); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (concluding that capital punishment's qualitative differ-
ence from all other punishments demands more reliable sentencing); Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring) (commenting that, in capital context, "law is
especially sensitive to demands for ... procedural fairness").
202. See Amsterdam, supra note 193, at 57 (concluding that risk of error and finality
of capital punishment mandate extraordinary judicial review). Amsterdam noted:
The irrevocability of an executed death sentence and the fallibility of human
judgement have forever been important objections to capital punishment ....
Patient, painstaking review of the legal claims of condemned inmates has been the
rule of judicial responsibility, not because the task was convenient, efficient, or
gratifying, but because its omission was unthinkable.
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cial review,' courts should not streamline capital appeals to address the
Lackey problem.'
B. Attribution of Delay
If due process requirements preclude streamlining capital appeals,'
courts may attempt to fault prisoners, rather than state actors, for death row
delays.' In the Lackey Memorandum, Justice Stevens theorized that there
may be constitutional significance to various types of delay' and proposed
to distinguish among delays resulting from (1) a prisoner's abuse of the
judicial system; (2) a prisoner's legitimate exercise of the right to review;
and (3) the state's intentionally dilatory tactics.? s These factors echo the
attribution-of-delay calculus employed by the Privy Council in Pratt.
In Pratt, the Privy Council determined that condemned prisoners lack
a constitutional claim for delay incurred through illegitimate means,21 and
it refused to include time spent during escape from prison or pursuit of
frivolous legal theories in calculating the length of delay.2 ' American
courts have agreed that a prisoner's dilatory tactics cannot ripen into Eighth
Amendment claims. 212 Additionally, both the American courts and the
203. See Lankford v. Ohio, 500 U.S. 110, 125 n.10 (1991) (discussing Court's heightened
standard of reliability for capital cases); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1979) (noting
that Court invalidates capital procedures which tend to diminish reliability of sentencing
determination); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (concluding that Eighth Amendment imposes
heightened standard for reliability in death sentence determination); Amsterdam, supra note
193, at 57 (advocating "patient, painstaking review" of capital cases).
204. See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text (noting that streamlined appeals
(1) undermine Court's policy of extraordinary procedural safeguards in capital context and
(2) fatally disadvantage capital defendants).
205. See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text (showing that Court's due process
requirements preclude expedited capital appeals).
206. See Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir.) (questioning "how we
can offer life... as a prize for one who can stall the processes for a given number of years"),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 965 (1960).
207. See Lackey.v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1422 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial
of certiorari) (stating that "[t]here may well be constitutional significance to the reasons for
the various delays that have occurred in [Clarence Lackey]'s case").
208. Id. at 1422.
209. See Pratt v. Attorney Gen., [1994] 2 App. Cas. 1 (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from
Jam.) (en banc) (distinguishing delays caused by death row prisoner's dilatory tactics from
delays caused by prisoner's legitimate use of appeals process or state's dilatory tactics);
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 364, 380 (1994), cited in Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1422.
210. Pratt, 33 I.L.M. at 380.
211. Id.
212. See Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1990) (commenting that
although courts should not penalize prisoners for pursuing constitutional rights, delay incurred
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Privy Council have agreed that a state's intentionally dilatory tactics are
actionable. 13 Thus, the state's deliberate attempts to prolong death row
incarceration should give rise to a successful constitutional claim.214
The more difficult question arises in attributing delay caused by a
prisoner's nonfrivolous appeals. In Pratt, the Privy Council found the state
responsible for delay incurred during the prisoner's exhaustion of appellate
issues.215 The Privy Council acknowledged that prisoners cause delay
through discretionary appeals. 216  However, the Council determined that
courts could not punish prisoners for the nonfrivolous resort to appellate
procedures. 217 The Privy Council reasoned that fault lies with an appellate
system that permits years of delay, rather than with the condemned prisoner
who legitimately pursues an appeal.218
The Pratt view finds some support in the international community.219
However, American courts have neither followed the Privy Council's
during ultimately unsuccessful pursuit of legal theories does not evolve into Eighth Amendment
claim); Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir.) (questioning "how we can offer
life... as a prize for one who can stall the processes for a given number of years, especially
when in the end it appears the prisoner never really had any good points"), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 965 (1960).
213. Compare Pratt, 33 I.L.M. at 380 (noting that Jamaican courts fault state for state's
dilatory tactics), with McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1995) (acknowledg-
ing potential viability of Lackey claim in "a situation where the (state] has set up a scheme to
prolong the period of incarceration, or rescheduled the execution repeatedly in order to torture
[petitioner]"), and Porter v. Singletary, 49 'F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that
Lackey claim has potential merit when petitioner offers evidence of state's deliberate or
negligent delay).
214. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466-67 (determining that Eighth Amendment claim could
arise from state's deliberate or negligent delay in capital case); Porter, 49 F.3d at 1485 (same).
215. See Pratt v. Attorney Gen., [1994] 2 App. Cas. 1 (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from
Jam.) (en banc) (finding delay incurred through prisoner's legitimate appeals attributable to
state), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 364, 384 (1994). The Privy Council explained:
In their Lordships' view a State that wishes to retain capital punishment must
accept the responsibility of ensuring that execution follows as swiftly as practicable
after sentence allowing a reasonable time for appeal and consideration of reprieve.
It is part of the human condition that a condemned man will take every opportunity
to save his life through use of the appellate procedure. If the appellate procedure
enables the prisoner to prolong the appellate hearings over a period of years, the
fault is to be attributed to the appellate system that permits such delay and not to





219. See Catholic Comm'n for Justice & Peace v. Attorney Gen., No. S.C. 73/93 (Sup.
Ct. Zimb. June 24, 1993), reprinted in 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. 323, 334 (1993) (stating that courts
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 291 (1997)
rule" nor employed the Lackey calculus that Justice Stevens proposed2' t
Instead, courts have distinguished between the delay incurred through
mandatory appeals and the delay occasioned by discretionary or collateral
review.' Although courts have recognized that the state may bear respon-
cannot discount mental suffering during delays resulting from prisoner's "maximum use of the
judicial process available"), overruled by ZiMB. CONST. amend. XIII (amending Declaration
of Rights' Section 15); Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989),
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1063, 1098 (1989) (declining to blame condemned prisoners for delay
and determining that Virginia death row delays potentially exceed limits of European Conven-
tion for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms); Vatheeswaran v. Tamil
Nadu, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 348, 353 (India 1983) (contending that "the cause of the delay is
immaterial when the sentence is death. . . .[even if] the cause for the delay [is] the time
necessary for appeal and consideration of reprieve or some other cause for which the accused
himself may be responsible, it would not alter the dehumanizing character of the delay"). But
see Schabas, supra note 27, at 186 (noting that United Nations Human Rights Committee has
determined that death row delays are neither cruel nor degrading when prisoners pursue
appellate procedures).
220. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that Pratt holding
will not prevail in United States). The McKenzie majority stated that death row petitioners
concerned with delay "should refuse to avail themselves of avenues of review." Id. at 1470
n.21. In responding to the majority's proposal, dissenting Judge Norris argued: "In advocating
that death row inmates forgo opportunities to remedy constitutional violations that they may
have suffered at trial and at sentencing in order to avoid suffering the additional constitutional
violation of cruel and unusual punishment, the majority gives new meaning to the notion of
'mockery of justice.'" Id. at 1489 (Norris, J., dissenting) (quoting Coleman v. Balkcom, 451
U.S. 949, 958-59 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari)); see also
Note, supra note 28, at 831 (concluding that courts should not fault prisoners for delays
incurred through legitimate appeals). The author explained:
Of course, it is possible for a prisoner to reduce the delay by refusing to pursue
any appeal or other dilatory course of action. This, however, would seem to be
tantamount to state-abetted suicide. As a matter of humane policy, if not constitu-
tional right, no onus should be placed on a prisoner's attempt to delay or prevent
his execution. To argue that the condemned's voluntary participation in causing
delay removes his mental suffering from constitutional scrutiny both ignores the
drive of self-preservation and penalizes the exercise of a legal right.
Id.
221. See Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995) (declining to employ
Justice Stevens's Lackey calculus in attributing death row delay); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924,
926-32 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 635-39 (5th Cir. 1995) (same);
Delvecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, No. 95-C-6637, 1995 WL 688675, at *8 (N.D.
IIM. Nov. 17, 1995) (same); Turner v. Jabe, No. 95-530-A, slip op. at 13 (E.D. Va. May 22,
1995) (asserting that Lackey calculus is unhelpful). But see McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466
(distinguishing state's deliberate or negligent delay tactics from other types of delay); Porter
v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995) (same).
222. See Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that delays
"incurred largely at the behest of Appellant . . .[through] repeated stays to pursue [legal
remedies]" did not implicate Eighth Amendment); Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th
Cir. 1995) (attributing time spent on direct appeal to state but attributing time spent on
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sibility for time spent on mandatory appeal,' most have concluded that
prisoners lack a constitutional claim for delay caused by discretionary
appeals. 24
This current approach falls short of Justice Stevens's theory that courts
should distinguish delay caused by a "legitimate exercise of right . . .
to review" from delay caused by "repetitive, frivolous filing."' In the
Lackey Memorandum, Justice Stevens proposed that different causes of
delay merit different judicial treatment.' At present, courts have deter-
collateral review to prisoner); Delvecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, No. 95-C-6637,
1995 WL 688675, at *8 (N.D. Il. Nov. 17, 1995) (determining that delay resulting from
petitioner's discretionary appeals did not implicate Eighth Amendment).
223. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1485 (noting that state claimed responsibility for time
petitioner spent on direct appeal); cf. Free, 50 F.3d at 1362 (declining to hear prisoner's
Eighth Amendment delay claim after factually distinguishing Lackey on basis of Clarence
Lackey's protracted direct appeals). Justice Stevens's attention may have alighted on Clarence
Lackey because Lackey's claim rested on delay incurred during two direct and mandatory
appeals. A Texas trial court sentenced Lackey to death in 1978. Lackey v. Scott, 885 F.
Supp. 958, 962 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Petitioner's Pre-Hearing Brief at 12 n.10, Lackey v. Scott,
885 F. Supp. 958 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (No. MO-95-CA-68-F). The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals completed Lackey's first mandatory direct appeal in 1684 days, at which time Lackey
was taken off death row. Lackey v. State, 638 S.W.2d 439, 471-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982);
Petitioner's Pre-Hearing Brief at 12 n.10. The trial court re-tried Lackey and sentenced him
to death again on April 16, 1983. Lackey v. Scott, 885 F. Supp. at 963; Petitioner's Pre-
Hearing Brief at 12 n. 10. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals took 2252 days to render a
decision on Lackey's second mandatory direct appeal. Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111, 122
(Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Petitioner's Pre-Hearing Brief at 12 n. 10. The Fifth Circuit affirmed
Lackey's conviction and death sentence. Lackey v. Scott, 28 F.3d 486, 486 (5th Cir. 1994).
Lackey's counsel filed a rehearing petition that the court initially granted, but subsequently
overruled 699 days later. Petitioner's Pre-Hearing Brief at 12 n.10. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals spent another 151 days disposing of a second rehearing petition and dis-
missed it on October 11, 1991. Id. The court issued its final mandate on October 26, 1991.
Id. The state trial court scheduled Lackey's first execution date for July 13, 1992 - 165 days
after the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals issued its final mandate. Id. Therefore, the state's
delay during mandatory direct appeal forced Lackey to spend 4951 days, or twelve and one-
half years, either on death row or under sentence of death. Id.
224. See Williams v. Chrans, 50 F.3d 1362, 1364 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding prisoner
caused challenged delay through discretionary collateral review and concluding that such delay
did not give rise to Eighth Amendment claim); Free, 50 F.3d at 1362 (same); Delvecchio,
1995 WL 688675, at *8 (same); see also Stafford, 59 F.3d at 1028 (attributing delay to
prisoner's use of appellate remedies and concluding that such delay did not give rise to Eighth
Amendment claim); McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466 (same).
225. Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1422 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of
certiorari); see also McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1486 (Norris, J., dissenting) (noting that Lackey
calculus requires courts to distinguish between delay caused by legitimate appeals and delay
caused by repetitive, frivolous filings).
226. See Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1422 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (noting
that there may be constitutional significance to reasons for delay and proposing that courts
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mined that all discretionary appeals, whether frivolous or well founded,
deprive prisoners of any protection against unconstitutional delay.' This
approach disadvantages prisoners with legitimate appellate issues because
such prisoners must forgo the Eighth Amendment protections implicated by
Lackey in order to pursue other constitutional claims.' Moreover, this
system fails to distinguish prisoners who accrue delay through legitimate
appeals from those who accumulate delay through purely dilatory tactics.9
These inequities warrant the conclusion that the Eighth Amendment protects
prisoners who have accrued delay through legitimate appeals.
C. An Appropriate Remedy
In Pratt, the Privy Council determined that capital punishment carries
a strong presumption of constitutional invalidity five years after sentenc-
ing."2 ° Although the American judiciary may never adopt a similar bright
line rule, 1 courts presented with Lackey claims agree that death row con-
finement reaches unconstitutional proportions between ten and twelve years
after sentencing."22 Even if a prisoner brings a successful Lackey claim,
distinguish between various types of delay).
227. See Free, 50 F.3d at 1362 (finding delay in Lackey petitioner's case inordinate but
concluding that petitioner lacked basis for Eighth Amendment claim because petitioner
caused delay by discretionary collateral review); Williams v. Chrans, 50 F.3d 1362, 1364
(7th Cir. 1995) (same); Delvecchio, 1995 WL 688675, at *8 (same).
228. See District Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass. 1980) (finding
fact that "the delay may be due to the defendant's insistence on exercising his appellate
rights does not mitigate the severity of the impact on the condemned individual.., the right
to pursue due process of law must not be set off against the right to be free of inhuman
treatment" (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring))); cf. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967) (prohibiting impediments to exercise
of constitutional rights); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (finding that judge
could not give instruction that jury could draw adverse inference from defendant's refusal
to testify because inference would be "a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitu-
tional privilege").
229. Cf. Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1422 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari)
(suggesting that courts should begin to distinguish between various types of delay); see also
McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1486 (9th Cir. 1995) (Norris, J., dissenting) (noting that
Lackey calculus would require courts to distinguish between delay caused by legitimate
appeals and delay caused by repetitive, frivolous filings).
230. Pratt v. Attorney Gen., [1994] 2 App. Cas. 1 (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from
Jam.) (en banc), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 364, 386 (1994).
231. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466 (stating that Pratt rule will not prevail in United
States).
232. See Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 930-31 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that petitioner
could have brought Eighth Amendment delay claim after spending approximately 11 years
on death row); McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1464-65 & n.6 (asserting that petitioner could have
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however, the question of an appropriate remedy remains.3
Courts have hypothesized that the Eighth Amendment claim lacks an
appropriate remedy because nothing can undo a prisoner's past suffering.'
Alternatively, one court has analogized the Lackey claim to prison-condition
cases.' That court speculated that the appropriate remedy for a Lackey
claim is judicial amelioration of the complained-of condition."
Presumably, judicial amelioration of a Lackey claimant's complained-of
condition could include streamlined appellate procedures or better death row
living conditions. However, streamlining capital appeals potentially violates
due process requirements 7 and fails to compensate prisoners already
exposed to harsh conditions of delay. Furthermore, courts cannot improve
torturous death row living conditions because the prisoner's undue mental
suffering is inherent to the death sentence."
brought Eighth Amendment delay claim when petitioner had spent 10 years on death row);
Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that three and one-half years
on death row during petitioner's direct appeal did not constitute inordinate delay, but
determining that 12 years in discretionary appeals constituted inordinate delay); Delvecchio
v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, No. 95-C-6637, 1995 WL 688675, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
17, 1995) (finding that five years on death row during petitioner's direct appeal did not
constitute inordinate delay, but remaining ten and one-half years spent on discretionary
review constituted inordinate delay); cf State v. Richmond, 886 P.2d 1329, 1334 (Ariz.
1994) (en banc) (commuting death sentence of petitioner who had spent more than 20 years
on death row). In Richmond, the Arizona Supreme Court commuted the death sentence of
a prisoner who had spent 20 years on Arizona's death row. M. at 1334. Although declining
to decide the prisoner's Eighth Amendment delay claim, the court noted the extraordinary
length of time Willie Lee Richmond spent on death row. Id. Significantly, the Arizona
Supreme Court quoted the Privy Council's Pratt opinion in reaching its decision. Id. at
1333 (quoting Pratt, 33 I.L.M. 364, 380).
233. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467 (questioning whether commutation to life is appro-
priate remedy for Eighth Amendment delay claim); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 638 n.8
(5th Cir. 1995) (same).
234. See McKenie, 57 F.3d at 1467 (noting that prisoner's anguish is "in the past" and
asserting that commutation to life would not relieve prisoner of pain already suffered);
Fearance, 56 F.3d at 638 (stating that, under prisoner's Lackey theory, prisoner "has
already suffered the cruel and unusual punishment occasioned by delay; executing him im-
mediately would not add to this type of punishment").
235. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995) (comparing petitioner's
Lackey claim to prison-conditions case).
236. See id. (noting that courts do not commute sentences in prison-conditions cases,
but instead ameliorate challenged conditions).
237. See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text (showing that Court's due process
requirements preclude expedited capital appeals).
238. See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text (describing psychologically torturous
environment of death rows).
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A better remedy for Lackey claims is commutation of the death sen-
tence. 239 Because the Lackey claim argues that protracted delay followed
by death is overly retributive and excessive punishment,' commutation of
a death sentence provides a remedy that immediately reduces punishment
to constitutionally permissible levels." Although courts cannot undo past
,suffering caused by delay, courts can remedy a prisoner's present and
future suffering by removing the death sentence 42 - the death row living
condition that makes delay intolerable.
VI. Conlusion
Lackey claims expose the competing tensions of ensuring adequate due
process and enforcing swift and humane justice.'3 To date, American
courts have sidestepped the Lackey dilemma by finding this claim to be pro-
cedurally barred.2' Instead, courts should recognize that Lackey claims
present an unusual constitutional problem that requires a flexible and equi-
table approach.' 4
Protracted death row confinement clearly inflicts severe mental suffer-
ing on death row inmates.' This suffering is gratuitous and devoid of
penological value: 7 Execution after prolonged imprisonment may exceed
239. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1488 & n.22 (Norris, J., dissenting) (noting that proper
remedy for Eighth Amendment delay claim is commutation to life sentence).
240. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (noting that protracted death row
confinement arguably satisfies state interest in retribution and asserting that death penalty
after prolonged delay may exceed state interest in retribution).
241. See PANNICK, supra note 190, at 85 (concluding that mental suffering caused by
delay may exceed constitutional limits when courts add physical suffering caused by execu-
tion to balance). Thus, by removing physical suffering through commutation of a death
sentence, courts can restore punishment to constitutionally permissible levels.
242. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1488 & n.22 (9th Cir. 1995) (Norris, J.,
dissenting) (noting that proper remedy for Eighth Amendment delay claim is commutation
to life sentence).
243. See supra notes 188-91, 200-04 and accompanying text (showing tension between
Court's mandate of extraordinary procedural safeguards and Lackey's Eighth Amendment
delay claim).
244. See cases cited supra note 18 (discussing procedural bars that prevent courts from
considering Lackey claims on merits).
245. See supra notes 152, 172-79 and accompanying text (noting that Lackey claims rest
on postconviction delay and arguing that courts, out of equity considerations, should con-
sider Lackey claims on merits).
246. See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text (examining severe psychological suf-
fering that protracted death row confinement causes).
247. See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text (demonstrating that protracted death
332
PROTRACTED DEATH ROW CONFINEMENT
the state's interest in retribution and provides little, if any, deterrent effect
on potential criminals.' s Furthermore, historical evidence fails to show
that the Framers or the Eighth Amendment's antecedents tolerated the cru-
elty of lengthy pre-execution confinement."9 In the absence of the Court's
justifying factors, protracted death row confinement violates the Eighth
Amendment.' Accordingly, our constitutional prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment mandates commutation of the death sentence for legiti-
mate Lackey claimants.
row confinement causes unnecessary suffering that is without penological value).
248. See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text (discussing how execution after
protracted death row confinement exceeds state interest in retribution and showing that
execution after protracted death row confinement provides minimal deterrent effect).
249. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text (examining historical evidence which
suggests that Framers did not tolerate protracted pre-execution confinement).
250. See supra notes 59, 74-77 and accompanying text (noting that, in absence of'
Court's justifying factors, death penalty violates Eighth Amendment).

